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NEW MISSILE SEEN 'IN KEEPING' WITH DETERRENCE DOCTRINE

LD031029 Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Jun 80 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Paul-Marie de la Gorce: "The Doctrine"]

[Text] Yesterday the president of the republic gave the French people at least one piece of news: France is going to build a mobile strategic surface-to-surface missile. This decision has a twofold meaning: the deterrent force will be developed and will continue to have several components. The internal logic of French strategy implied this development: it requires that priority be given to the nuclear forces, and that is what is being done.

Mr Giscard d'Estaing recalled that "any nuclear attack on French territory would automatically spark off a strategic nuclear response." Indeed it is this threat of retaliation which keeps the peace between nuclear powers. It could be asked why he did not add that the nuclear force also deters any conventional attack--which is taught to all levels of our armed forces. However, the remark made by the president of the republic should be, as he suggested, placed "in context," since it is now thought that an enemy could, instead of first engaging the bulk of its conventional forces, first use very accurate nuclear weapons such as the SS20 missile to destroy the West's defense system. This means that France considers in advance that this would be an attack which would justify no less than a full nuclear response. Indeed, nothing could be more in keeping with the French deterrence doctrine.

There is no contradiction between this doctrine and pursuing research into the neutron weapon: France does not want to abandon any new path in the arms sphere and reserves the right to possess any means of defense. However, there would be a contradiction if the "neutron bomb" were regarded as the supreme tool of French defense policy, lined up in face of a possible enemy and sufficient to bar his way: it would then be a radical change in strategy.

Apparently the president of the republic does not have this in mind: his analyses of deterrence included no reference to a "forward battle" or any other form of battle.

However, although the consistency of French strategy has been preserved at least for the next few years, is it compatible with the use of nuclear weapons such as the president of the republic mentioned? First he specified: "We will take account of the following fact: France is directly concerned by the security of neighboring European states." And when asked to explain himself he replied: "The importance of this affirmation is to leave it as it stands."

This remark has both a political and a strategic meaning. First it means that France will decide itself when and how to intervene. However it also implies, as in the past, that the deterrent is to ensure the country's vital interests--of which the security of neighboring states is clearly part--without fixing its limits in advance. If these limits were fixed at the national borders, that would amount to leaving an enemy to do whatever he liked outside, in other words tying the hands of the head of state, who could do nothing before the borders were attacked, and nothing but unleash the nuclear thunderbolt afterward. An enemy warned that the situation in neighboring states could act as a signal to unleash it is left in uncertainty, which is one of the main elements of deterrence.

However, while we can hope that despite the inevitable controversy the deterrent will still receive general assent, it is doubtful that the president of the republic's pleas for a 12-month military service will receive unanimous backing. His arguments carry considerable weight, but it is not necessarily giving way to the temptation to "give up" and "resign" to ask questions about the suitability of the armed forces for the current strategy and to ask, in particular, whether the army has structures which correspond to this strategy. In any case, yesterday's press conference will not put an end to the discussion on this point.

CSO: 3100

MODERNIZATION OF 'FORCE DE FRAPPE' DESCRIBED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 30 Jun 80 pp 126-132

[Article: "Killing Them Once Is Enough"]

[Text] French military men want to build the neutron bomb which the United States did not dare to do. To modernize the 'force de frappe,' which has become vulnerable, the third strongest atomic power in the world is planning to build new bombers, missiles and submarines. One-third of the Fifth Republic's military budget is spent on its prestige weapon each year-- some DM 13 billion in 1980.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing is convinced that "there is a danger of war" and he adds: "This is one of those periods in history in which the fate of the world depends on the nervous strength of just a few men."

The French chief of state, who doubles as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, regards himself as one of those who possess the requisite nervous strength. In theory he has been through several wars already. In a command center located in the cellar of his office at the Elysée Palace in Paris he has held atomic war games at irregular intervals.

The president last went down the 53 steps to his command post (known as "Jupiter") which is protected by a series of armor-plate doors to test the readiness of French atomic bombers and atomic submarines at least two but mostly three of which are constantly cruising the Mediterranean, the Atlantic or the North Sea around the end of May.

Connected directly to them via TV, Giscard can speak simultaneously with General Guy Mery, the head of the general staff, and with the operations center of the "Mirage"-IV bomber fleet

(located at Taveny near Paris) or with the submarine command (located at Houilles near Versailles and at Mont Verdun near Lyons.)

Within seconds, computers supply information on the location of all submarines as well as the targets they could reach and how many of the 18 MRBM's emplaced in silos 23 meters deep on the Plateau d'Albion in southern France are actually ready for launch. Up-to-the-minute data on enemy dispositions is also transmitted via TV screens.

25,968 men are assigned to the French strategic and tactical nuclear strike force, which is the third largest in the world. One-third of the French military budget is being spent on it on a continuing basis-- this year about DM 13 billion.

All told, Giscard could bring more than 100 strategic nuclear warheads into action, corresponding to about 90 megatons or 4,160 bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. Here is a detailed listing of the weapons systems available to the French chief of state:

36 strategic nuclear bombers of the type
Mirage IV which could just about reach
Kiev with in-flight refueling

about 75 tactical nuclear bombers of the
type Mirage III E and "Jaguar" with an
effective range of 290 to 1140 kilometers

34 tactical nuclear bombers of the type
"Super-Etendard" stationed aboard aircraft
carriers with a range of 300 to 700 kilo-
meters

9 MRBM's with an S-2 150-kiloton warhead
and a range of 3000 kilometers; by 1982,
these missiles will be equipped with an
S-3 one-megaton warhead

9 S-3 missiles with a range of 3500 kilo-
meters

5 operational atomic submarines which are
to be equipped by the summer of 1980 with
16 one-megaton missiles of the M-20 type;
another submarine, equipped with MIRV's,
will be placed in service in 1985

30 tactical "Pluton" missiles with a range of 120 kilometers.

This nuclear arsenal, the French feel, gives them an adequate second strike capability. This capability to react to atomic attack with an atomic counter-blow would be a good deal less potent than that of the U.S. or the USSR but could inflict such heavy losses upon a potential enemy that he would desist from launching the first strike. Any nuclear attack against France, Giscard said last Thursday, would "automatically bring on a strategic counter-strike."

In order to preserve this deterrent potential as a "guarantee of France's independence," the chief of state must now make decisions which "are of vital importance for the future of our country," as one of Giscard's generals put it-- the point being that "the atomic strike force must get a face-lift."

Obsolescence has long since caught up with the "Force de Frappe," the name given to their mini nuclear strike force by the French. Weapons systems like the Mirage IV which have been in operation since 1964 as well as the "Pluton" tactical nuclear missiles must be replaced by the end of this decade. Giscard must also decide on a possible alternative to the missiles stationed on the Plateau d'Albion which are threatened by the accurate Soviet SS-20 missiles.

And another thing: Both the Soviets and Americans are pressing ahead with their programs of research and development of satellite-supported systems for detecting and tracking strategic submarines which, according to chief of staff Méry, "over the next few years will gradually decrease" their present invulnerability.

Such are the limits placed upon France's nuclear strike force by the fact that the budget available is small as compared to that of the big powers. But France is unwilling to accept this and once more indulges in the kind of self-deception practiced at the time the "Force de Frappe" was first conceived.

As early as in October 1945, Charles de Gaulle, president of the provisional government of recently liberated France, ordered the creation of an atomic energy authority which was to concern itself with the "development of atomic energy in various fields of science, industry and national defense.

During the war in Indochina, when the U.S. refused to use the bomb to help the hard-pressed French, they got a first taste of what it means to have to depend on the United States. They received a second warning when the superpowers put a halt to the Franco-British Suez adventure in 1956.

It was in 1954 that the left-leaning Mendes France government --secretly-- began developing an atomic bomb. In 1958, two years after the first nuclear power plant went into operation, the then French premier Felix Gaillard gave the official go-ahead for building the bomb-- and at the time the whole world was wondering why.

General Charles Louis Ailleret, who later under de Gaulle was named chief of the general staff and who is one of the advocates of the bomb, called its possession a guarantee against "the terrible events of 1914 and 1940 repeating themselves."

Ailleret, a former resistance fighter and inmate of Buchenwald, warned his countrymen of the "ever-present risk" that Germany would suddenly "one day try once again to dominate the world" and would obviously "begin with its neighbors." The atom bomb would protect France from German expansionism.

The war of attrition in Algeria made France feel a second-class member of NATO. This explains why de Gaulle, when he took office in 1958, made a point of immediately stating that "nothing matters more for the French people" than once more to believe "in France's being a great power." And he told his World War II comrade-in-arms Eisenhower by letter that France was now ready again to assume its "historic role" in the world.

Political scientist and military expert Wilfried Kohl in his book "French Nuclear Policy" has said that in contrast to the politicians and military men of the Fourth Republic, who were quite prepared to integrate France's nuclear potential into NATO, de Gaulle looked upon it as "a political-military instrument" destined to be "the symbol of the independent conduct of affairs by the Fifth Republic."

As a consequence, de Gaulle took France's military forces out of NATO in 1966 (while maintaining the political ties to the alliance) and henceforth staked everything on the atomic strike force.

The NATO Council at the Porte Dauphine in Paris and the military headquarters at Rocquencourt and Fontainebleau had to move and the American troops stationed in France were asked to leave. Even today, neither they, nor soldiers from any other NATO country, are permitted to enter France in uniform without special authorization.

French nuclear strategy is based on the premise that the threat of total annihilation weakens the resolve of any country to risk its chances for survival by coming to another country's aid. In other words, nuclear risk is indivisible; alliances are out of date in the nuclear age.

Nonetheless, France did not sever its military ties to NATO altogether. She remained connected to the alliance's early warning system and uses American position finding satellites to track her submarines. Information obtained by U.S. spy satellites is made available to the French military and American KC-135's are used for in-flight refueling of Mirage atomic bombers.

Message traffic and the relaying of orders in the French navy has to be conducted in NATO-English, since the transmission of tracking data on Soviet submarines, for example, would otherwise be impossible. But above all, the French, as America's ally, retained the protection of that nuclear superpower which they had snubbed politically.

There are French liaison officers attached to SHAPE at Casteau in Belgium and to ALCENT at Brunssum in the Netherlands. Jointly with Germany, which is permitted to store up to 100,000 tons of ammunition in France, the French are turning out "Hot" and "Milan" missiles as well as the "Alpha-Jet" and, until 1990, the "Leopard-3."

Giscard's political party, the moderately Atlantic-oriented UDP, would not think of leading France back into the NATO fold. The Allies "have at last realized that we have no intention of doing so," was the way one French general put it.

On the other hand, France might find herself in the position of having to make use of her "strategic deterrent" beyond her national boundaries in case "our country's forefield is occupied by an aggressor."

Giscard himself has repeatedly stated publicly that he feels bound to the 1949 NATO treaty, Article 5 of which specifies that an attack on one or more members of the alliance will be regarded as an attack on all signatories. Just last week Giscard said that France "has a direct concern for the security of her European neighbors."

Giscard does not conceive of France's independent stance as weakening but as strengthening the alliance. More than just one command and decision-making apparatus, he argues, makes it more difficult for the adversary to gauge Western reaction in case of war. Increased uncertainty entails increased risk for Moscow.

Leaving aside the Force de Frappe, the actual potential of the French armed forces, now termed as the "NATO reserve" by the UDP, is very limited, above all because such huge amounts have been spent on the nuclear weapons.

As a result, total tonnage of the French navy has slipped below 250,000 tons. Hardly any warships were built between 1960 and 1970, the head of the French general staff admits. This means that "tonnage and actual number of ships will decrease further until 1985."

The French army has only slightly more than half as many tanks as the German army although the two armies are of almost equal strength in terms of personnel. Another important area of weakness: Although the "Roland" anti-aircraft missile was developed jointly with the FRG, the French do not have a truly effective anti-aircraft capability.

But even the Force de Frappe has its problems. The nuclear missiles stationed on the Plateau d'Albion, representing more than 8 percent of the French nuclear arsenal, are incapable of reaching the Soviet armament centers in Siberia. The 36 Mirage-IV's, supported by a mere 11 refueling planes, are capable of reaching Kiev, if refueled in flight, but would not have enough fuel to return to base.

Only the submarines would be capable of destroying Moscow and even Volgograd from positions in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea.

Charles de Gaulle once said there was no doubt that the Americans and Russians could kill humanity off a hundred or a thousand times over with their nuclear arsenal. France's goals are more modest, he said: "Killing them just once is enough for us."

To maintain this second-strike capability, the Gaullist RPR has come out for building four new nuclear submarines at a cost of P- 4 billion each between 1985 and 1991 and laying the keel of six more by the year 2010.

The Gaullists are also calling for the construction of 100 Mirage-4000 bombers, a two-engine jet capable of carrying Cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers.

But French military planners felt that this model was too expensive. The overage Mirage-IV will therefore rather be replaced by the one-engine Mirage-2000 with an only slightly greater depth of penetration.

For a few years more at least, 15 Mirage-IV's equipped with nuclear air-to-ground missiles will continue to fly so as "to prevent the possibility of weakening the defense potential while modernization is underway."

France is expanding her nuclear armaments and her nuclear power plants with an equal lack of concern. Following Giscard's orders to the defense council to develop the neutron bomb, which Egon Bahr has called "a symbol of perverted thinking" and which the United States did not dare build, the French have now tested the weapon. By 1982 at the earliest, Giscard could make a decision on when to start production-- provided he is re-elected next year. As to what his decision might be, Giscard said last Thursday, that would depend on the state of nuclear armaments in Europe at that time.

Technical preparations for the construction of mobile launching sites for nuclear missiles with three warheads are to be completed by the end of this year. These missiles, to be moved to new positions at irregular intervals on tractor-trailers, are supposed to escape enemy detection-- a method already being used by the Soviets and the Americans.

Initially, the French general staff had been considering the use of Cruise missiles. But Paris now believes that the Soviet Union will be concentrating its efforts on combating this weapons system now that NATO has decided to modernize and to station Cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and the FRG.

In addition, the Cruise missile system calls for the use of several satellites and they, too, are not affordable for a mini-nuclear power like France.

9478
CSO: 3103

PCF PANEL DISCUSSES EFFORT FOR NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER

LD040815 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Jun 80 p 9

[Unattributed report: "For a New World Economic and Political System"]

[Text] In Bezons last Saturday [21 June] the [PCF] Central Committee foreign policy and economic sections jointly held a study day to consider this great PCF objective stressed at the 23d congress: The struggle for the new world economic system.

Chaired by Secretariat member Maxime Grenetz and opened by Politburo member Philippe Herzog, the day provided an opportunity for rich and detailed exchanges of views.

The main questions raised were energy and raw materials, technology transfers, the struggle against famine, the new system and human rights and the democratization of international bodies.

The discussion and the opening speech highlighted the convergence of possible struggles among the peoples of developing countries, the working classes in the developed countries and the socialist countries. This convergence and complexity stems from the imperialist policy pursued by the capitalist countries which are trying to make the working class in these countries as well as the socialist countries and developing countries pay for the chaos engendered by their domination.

The two sections' contributions in preparation for this meeting and Saturday's debate highlighted the crucial question of taking into account peoples' mutual interests in making real progress in new struggles and new areas of agreement for a new world economic and political system.

The attitude adopted by the Giscardian government and social democracy, which are trying to turn the struggle for the new system back against the peoples and the workers, formed the subject of numerous speeches.

The participants stressed the role which France should have in this sphere and made specific contributions to this subject. The constructive nature of the meeting was stressed by Maxime Grenetz who called on the two sections to pursue and intensify their thinking.

CSO: 3100

AKEL ACCUSED OF FOLLOWING SOVIET LINE

Nicosia TO THARNOS in Greek 16 Jun 80 p 8

[Text] "Moscow knew of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus but it displayed great tolerance and did not make the slightest move to avert it nor has it openly condemned it since then." This charge which indeed is not a new one but which shows the wicked stand of Russia toward Cyprus is revealed by the Athenian newspaper NEA FORKIA which is considered to be the journalistic organ of the New Democracy [Party].

This revelation of the Russian-Turkish collusion was prompted by the recent AKEL action which according to the newspaper "is dictated from abroad and aims at promoting the objectives of the Soviet Union." The full text of the NEA FORKIA article is as follows:

"It would be a vain effort to discuss the reasons AKEL (the Communist Party of Cyprus) invoked to justify the political crisis it created in the island. They do not explain its decision and it would be a mistake to believe that it acted on its own initiative and after assessing the situation.

"AKEL belongs to the category of communist parties which blindly serve the Soviet Union's foreign policy. It is inconceivable to it that it can act not against but independently of the Moscow line. Of course, it would not dare take such a very serious decision as the one that brought about the crisis in the island without the encouragement or suggestion of the Soviets.

"It is not at all accidental (the fact) that EKE has from the very first moment sided unreservedly with AKEL thus acting contrary to all other political parties of Greece which criticized AKEL's decision and recommended that the unity of Cypriot Hellenism be restored.

"Let us not kid ourselves. AKEL's decision to torpedo the unity of the Greek Cypriots at a time, moreover, which is critical and decisive for their future is not the result of a simple inter-party dispute. It is inspired from abroad. It aims at promoting the objectives of a foreign

power regardless of whether its side-effects serve Turkey's interests at the same time. There exists, moreover, [a precedent] in this case of the Moscow-Ankara interests. On the eve of the Attila invasion of Cyprus Soviet Ambassador Grubiakov [transliteration] met with Turkish president Koruturk. Ankara did not want to risk a military operation against Cyprus without at least having secured Moscow's tolerance. And it did secure it. The Soviet Union did not make the slightest move to avert the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

"Of course, the Soviets did not work for the benefit of Turkey. They had their own plans which favored the invasion. It seems that they had felt that the moment was ripe for realizing one more move on the political chessboard where the future of Cyprus is played.

"AKEL is being used as a simple pawn with EKE's assistance. Thus, we find ourselves at the start of a new critical phase of the Cyprus problem which requires intensive monitoring of the situation, unity between Greece and Cyprus and proper handling."

7520
CSO:4908

NEW PATROL BOATS, SPECIFICATIONS REPORTED

Nicosia EIKONES in Greek 30 May-5 Jun 80 pp 23, 40

[Text] The "Kimon" and the "Afroditi," the two new modern coastguard vessels which the Cypriot Government has purchased from France, were incorporated officially into the Port and Maritime Police of Cyprus, following an official dedication ceremony which was conducted in Limassol on Friday, 9 May, by Minister of Interior and Defense Khristodoulos Veniamin.

As Veniamin stated in his speech, "our intention is to increase the number of these boats by the acquisition of larger and more effective boats, so that we can have every means available for dealing with illegal acts in the most direct and efficient way. And in the future, the Cypriot police is going to be reinforced by airplanes, so that it can investigate every kind of illegality." He also stressed that Cyprus is being used as a relay station, not only by international smugglers of narcotics, but also by smugglers of weapons.

Besides Veniamin, the following were also present at this ceremony: Metropolitan of Limassol Khrysanthos, who performed the blessing; the French ambassador to Cyprus, (Olivie); the commercial attache to the French embassy, (Rene Cosiar); a representative of the Greek embassy; Chief of Police Savvas Andoniou; the commander of the national guard, General Conninos; the commander of the motorized immediate-action unit, Papakostas; the head of the Port Police, Andreas Artymatas; local authorities of the city of Limassol, deputies, and other officials, as well as a large crowd of people.

The blessing was followed by an address by Chief of Police Andoniou, who stated among other things: "Because of its geographical position, Cyprus forms the point where the paths of many countries cross, and every year many foreigners visit it for reasons of tourism and trade. But besides these," stressed Andoniou, "we also have cases of international crooks who exploit Cyprus as a relay station and as a center for their illegal activities. Thus the purpose of these two boats is to pursue these international crooks and take action against international crime and smuggling of every sort."

Mr Andoniou also stated that the delivery of these coastguard boats was effected from France by men of the Port Police of Cyprus, who were sent there and trained at the boatmaking plant in that country, and that the bad weather conditions which prevailed during their return trip were successfully handled--thus establishing in advance the subsequent effectiveness of the two boats.

Next, the French ambassador took the floor, and in a brief address he stressed the close ties of friendship and the good relations which have linked Cyprus and France for a long time, and he said that "these vessels are one more confirmation of such ties."

Minister of Interior and Defense Khr. Veniamin said in his speech, among other things: "Along with the ravages which were caused by the Turkish invasion, another consequence was the reduction of the sea coasts of Cyprus. From 1975 to today," stated the minister, "Cyprus has not had any boats for investigating violations of the law along its coasts. And many events have taken place in our neighboring countries which affect our own security, order, and enforcement of the laws.

"In recent times"--continued the minister--"there has been an increasing trend toward smuggling and the exploiting of Cyprus by international criminals as a transit station for the smuggling of arms or narcotics. The consequences of this are destructive both for Cyprus and for mankind as a whole. It was essential," stressed Veniamin, "that Cyprus acquire these boats, which although they are the first ones will not be the last. But we are thinking of strengthening our own forces from the air as well, and I hope that this will be done very soon."

After the conclusion of this ceremony, Mr Veniamin and the other officials inspected the boats, and French Ambassador (Olivie) handed over to the Port Police a map of the Mediterranean showing the surrounding countries, which also showed the course followed by the two coastguard boats from their departure from northern France to their arrival in Cyprus.

As we were informed by Andreas Artymatas, a police superintendent and head of the Port Police at the national level, the two coastguard boats were built at the plant of (Guy Couas), which is located in Arcachon (northern France) [sic], a small town near Bordeaux. The two fast-moving vessels are oil-fueled, have a length of 19 meters, and use an engine of 750 horsepower. And the maximum speed which they can develop is 29 knots.

They are equipped with all the conveniences for a 10-member crew (bed and board, shower-baths), and they will be manned on a 24-hour basis. Specifically, they have: Two cabins, with six and four beds respectively, a kitchen, two bathrooms, an armory, and an engine room. As for their

armament, they are completely equipped and can cope with any mission to which they are assigned.

A 7-member crew of the Port Police, headed by Artymatas--who was trained at the boatmaking plant and in turn trained the remaining members of the Port Police--went to take delivery of the boats from Arcachon, so that today the boats can be manned by trained personnel.

The mission of the boats, and by extension the mission of the Port and Maritime Police, is the policing of the port and anchorage areas of the Republic, traffic control in these areas, the guarding of merchandise, the protecting of life and property within the territorial waters of the Republic, and the hindering of smuggling, of the illegal importing of narcotics and weapons, and of illegal fishing and immigration.

Prior to the Turkish invasion, the Port Police--which was established in 1956--had five launches, three of which had a length of 40 feet and two engines of 100 horsepower. The other two had a length of 30 feet. Of these, one had an engine of 100 horsepower and the other an engine of 60 horsepower. One of them was built by the men of the Port and Maritime Police themselves. But the Turkish invasion brought it many and serious losses. Its dockyard was shelled and utterly destroyed, and three launches and two small boats were captured by the invaders.

With the acquisition of these two new modern launches, this branch of our forces will be reorganized and will then be able to measure up to its serious mission in an effective way.

12114

CSO: 4908

PAPER NOTES INCREASED BLOC NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN NEARBY WATERS

LD080905 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Jun 80 Pt 1, p 7

[Report by Mogens Auning: "Eastern Bloc Powers Increase Naval Activity in Danish Waters"]

[Text] The Polish Government has apologized to the Danish Government for the naval episode that took place south of Hesseloe on 11 June. A large Polish landing craft of the "Polnochniy" class entered Danish territorial waters--and ended up in the middle of a Danish fleet exercise. The Polish ship was stopped and escorted into international waters by Danish naval vessels.

The Danish defense forces are aware of indications that the Warsaw Pact's maritime exercise activities are on the increase. The Polish landing craft was circumnavigating Sjaelland when it was stopped. On 24 and 25 June an East German minesweeper of the "Condor" class undertook the circumnavigation of Sjaelland.

The Danish defense forces have recorded that there are 20 to 30 such circumnavigations a year. They are principally undertaken by ships from the Polish and East German fleets. There are often landing craft between the ships that make the circumnavigation. The intention seems to be to gain a knowledge of Danish waters, so as to be able to maneuver in them even though all markings would have been removed in a crisis situation.

Four Soviet Russian submarines of the so-called "Whisky" class left the Baltic through the Oeresund on 26 and 27 June. The navy thinks that the submarines will take part in a Russian fleet exercise which is taking place at the moment in the Atlantic north of Britain. The departure of so many submarines is something of a rarity, naval sources said.

In 1976 the Danish Government fixed rules for foreign warships' passage through Danish territorial waters. They state that if more than three warships from the same station pass through Danish waters, advance warning must be given through diplomatic channels. In order to get around this the four Russian submarines left the Baltic in pairs of 12 hours apart.

As well as indications that Warsaw Pact naval activity around Denmark is on the increase the Danish defense forces have also noticed that it is happening further and further north. At the beginning of the month a combined Russian-East German-Polish fleet for the first time went out into the North Sea through the great belt. After a voyage to Britain and back up the west coast of Jutland it returned to the Baltic.

CSO: 3106

U.S.-EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES ON CURRENT ISSUES DISCUSSED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Theo Sommer, datelined Washington: "The Chancellor and the President"]

[Text] To the outside world the high and mighty gentlemen and their advisers like to give the impression of perfect harmony. European-American dissension? German-American disagreements in particular? Nothing more than a figment of new media imagination, they now maintain, pure invention, boundless exaggeration. Dissension has been stilled, they continue, no sting is left, everything is a.o.k. once more. Blessed is he who believes any of this.

In Washington, sweltering in the heat of early summer, nobody believes the official statements. Carter took along to Europe all his senior foreign policy advisers. The rearguard left back in the White House and the State Department makes no attempt to hide its opinions. In the Congress which is listlessly arming for the forthcoming election campaign, representatives and senators are even more forthright.

"At the present time it is the fashion in Washington to appear anti-European," says a man of the old foreign policy elite, who was unable to get anywhere under Carter and is not willing to get anywhere under Reagan. "Loyalty tests are at a premium, and so are expressions of subservience, nothing more." He is quite deliberate in using the term loyalty test, infamous since the McCarthy era. "A very odd way of conducting foreign politics," he adds bitinglly.

Washington's mood is anti-European, nobody can deny that. It is still less pervasive in the State Department, because the diplomats there are too experienced and too sophisticated to embrace stereotyped oversimplifications. The breath of displeasure is more noticeable in the White House. Among so influential members of Congress on Capitol Hill it has turned into a fairly strong wind.

Strong and Obstinate

Everywhere, though, questions and complaints are directed to Bonn. Ever since Charles de Gaulle the Americans have been used to French obstructionism.

Margaret Thatcher's resounding rhetoric hides the fact that English policies are in fact limp--see the Olympics boycott, see the sanctions against Iran. Criticism therefore concentrates on the Federal Republic, above all Helmut Schmidt. The West Germans are America's strongest partner and, at the same time, the most obstinate. The Federal Chancellor does not hesitate to say what he thinks when German interests are at stake. And many European countries listen to him, indeed follow him. All this amounts to more or less an invitation to assign him the role of the bogeyman.

Disquiet is greatest among representatives and senators. Many of them show signs of having listened once too often to the perpetual talk of "European self-Finlandization"; Zbigniew Brzezinski has scored a rather dubious success here. The hesitation and lack of courage of the trans-Atlantic partners during the Tehran hostage drama and the Afghanistan crisis is felt to be "treason." One senator expressed a common complaint: "You do business with detente, we are carrying the burden of confrontation. That was certainly not our intention."

Arguments of the Bonn opposition also fuel the suspicion that the Federal Republic might wish to loosen the Atlantic ties. There is fear that the Germans may attempt, after all, to steal away--toward neutrality. Whenever a Social Democratic visitor surfaces in Washington and ventures the thought that divided Germany should act as a "bridge" between East and West, even well-meaning members of Congress get goose pimples. "The SPD makes this capital feel very nervous," we are told quite frankly. "In Latin America the Friedrich Ebert Foundation helps the Marxists build up the cohorts who later confront America's friends. And what are SPD intentions at home?" This kind of talk may be confused, but it is heard on all sides. "A bridge stands between two banks," says one representative. "We always thought you were on our side."

Another member of Congress talks of his anxiety regarding the Social Democrats possible return to the Germany plans of the 1950's. In the background is the fear that 70 new SPD deputies entering the next Bundestag might be so far on the left that neither Helmut Schmidt nor Brandt nor Wehner could bar them from turning to the East (assuming that Brandt and Wehner would want to do so). Visible at this stage is the complete irresponsibility of some election campaign rhetoric from the opposition: The arguments used by Franz Josef Strauss to belabor Lukas Schmidt are presumed to be gospel truth instead of the hucksterish boasting they really are.

It is still difficult to assess what may be the end result of the ill-feeling on Capitol Hill. The most dangerous outcome would be the renaissance of the Mansfield Resolution, this time from the right: Insistent pressure by the Congress for a reduction of the American garrisons in Western Europe, which now count 300,000 men, two thirds of them in the Federal Republic. William Safire, a conservative columnist for the NEW YORK TIMES, has lately lent his full support to that idea. John McCloy--certainly one of Germany's staunchest friends--also alluded to the Mansfield Resolution at two European-

American conferences. His anxious warning: "West European security should not be considered an a priori American interest; in fact it is something which Europeans must work for in their own European interest."

The mood in the White House is somewhat more relaxed than might have been expected after the many German-American clashes of recent months. "As regards Iran, the Europeans were generally helpful. They offered only diplomatic help, but the real difficulty is the fact that there is no proper central authority in Tehran. The hostages have now become involved in the internal Iranian power struggle. And though we would have wished for stronger economic sanctions--those finally imposed were linked with an urgent political appeal."

I thought I did not hear right. Had there not been many months of tug-of-war, even dispute about the appropriate line in the hostage affair? Did all this not involve serious tensions with regard to consultation? Were not European and American views about the use of military force diametrically opposed? Not 10 weeks earlier the same interlocutor from the National Security Council had overwhelmed me with reproaches. Now he is appeasing. "Well, we did not always look at matters this way. At times things got somewhat rough. This has changed since our attempt at freeing the hostages. It is somehow as if the failure of the expedition had lanced the abscess. The American public's clamor for a military intervention in Iran has ceased. Now Europeans and Americans are on the same wavelength. We were always agreed about the aim. Once the hostages are free, Europe and Japan will have to take the lead in diplomatic relations with Tehran, because the United States are unlikely to be able quickly to resume the status quo ante. But all of us are pulling in the same direction..."

Rumbling Below the Surface

Afghanistan is something else again. Of course there are many areas of agreement between Americans and Europeans, but there are also many profound differences.

"Where is the agreement?"

"We agree that it would be a serious matter if the freedom movement were to be crushed; that Pakistan must be helped; that we should do nothing to drive Iran into the arms of Moscow; that we must restore the military balance of power in the Gulf region; that Turkey deserves support; that NATO must strengthen its defenses--something, incidentally, NATO is doing with far greater success than one might have assumed 9 months ago."

"And where are the differences?"

They arise from the question how the West is to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Behind this lies another question: Can the deterrent function outside of Europe unless the Europeans let their policy toward Moscow

be determined by Soviet behavior in the Third World? We Americans believe that such a link would strengthen the deterrent; the Europeans fear the contrary."

Rumblings below the surface is a reproach voiced elsewhere in Washington also: The Europeans are conducting business as usual, and this indicates either the basest profit motive or sheer lack of courage. The people in the White House entirely fail to appreciate that Jimmy Carter's constant shilly-shallying on the Iran issue may have caused this European hesitation in the Afghanistan affair, because every EEC head of government who might have taken a hard line against Moscow was afraid of new about-turns by Carter.

"What would be important?"

"We believe that the Soviets would proceed even more recklessly if they had reason to assume that detente in Europe would persist, regardless of what they might do anywhere else."

"It is surely not in the American interest to jeopardize detente in and around Berlin or the relations between the two German states?"

"Of course not. Still, we should not act as if the West alone were profiting from detente. The East certainly does so too. It profits from trade with us and from Western technology. It is in this field that the Soviets ought to be punished for their expansionism."

"What should the Europeans, the Germans, have done?"

"We never intended to declare a trade war. Nor did we at any time suggest that the Chancellor should not travel to Moscow. When Schmidt came to Washington last March, the President addressed two requests to him: First promptly to decide on boycotting the Olympic Games; second to cancel export credit guarantees for transactions with the Soviet Union. If Schmidt had pronounced his final decision on the Olympic boycott at an early stage, this would have influenced the other European nations. If he had agreed to cancel export credit guarantees, he would have given a clear signal that the Soviets can no longer take for granted the unobstructed flow of Western loans. Several issues would by now wear a very different complexion indeed if the Chancellor had met these two requests. Are we really asking too much if we urge that economic relations after Afghanistan should at least not be even more intensive?"

For a moment my interlocutor pensively regarded the old stucco ceiling of his office. Policemen patrolled the White House garden. The new solar collectors on the flat roof of the northwest wing glittered in the sun.

"We are quite aware," he resumed, "that the Germans are the greatest beneficiaries of detente. In this respect we should certainly show some sensitivity. Nevertheless we must regret that the Europeans--and the Germans--

have so far failed to answer our question where, outside of Europe, the limits are to be drawn for the Soviets."

Talking of sensitivity, the conversation inevitably turned to Carter's latest letter to Helmut Schmidt—a model of tactlessness in diplomatic usage. Anyway, why did the President write a letter to the Chancellor at all? Why did he do so 8 days before meeting with him in Venice and in the same week U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher met with State Secretary van Well on Monday, and Senator Biden—fully briefed at home—saw Schmidt on Friday, while on Saturday David Aron, Brzezinski's deputy, met with the Chancellor in Bonn? Why the remark about "press reports" in Carter's letter --as if the American Embassy staff in Bonn were not able to obtain reliable information at all times?

Why then a letter--instead of a telephone conversation between the principals? To clearly explain two things: For one that Washington does not wish for an agreed moratorium, that is no treaty with the Russians which, at its expiry in 1983, would involve a second political decision: To extend or not to extend? For the other because the NATO rearmament resolution, in any case beset with difficulties of implementation in Holland and Belgium and accepted in Italy only after a great deal of trouble, must not be watered down.

Why at this point in time? Because it was not certain how much time Carter and Schmidt would have with one another in Venice; because the Chancellor--had the White House waited--might have repeated his earlier rather imprecise proposals; finally because a misunderstanding was to be settled, which could have clouded the Venice as well as the Moscow meetings.

Why the reference to press reports? Why the indiscretion? And why were the strong State Department objections simply disregarded? No answer to these questions is forthcoming from the White House. Elsewhere a version is offered to the effect that all of this had been a Brzezinski maneuver because he is losing ground to Muskie and grasped the opportunity to maintain his status and influence.

In the meantime the affair seems to have been settled. Misunderstanding is the official interpretation. In a brief reply, sent before the Venice summit, Schmidt stuck to his guns. The English version of the letter which landed on Carter's desk read: "I stick to what I have said. It would serve the cause of peace if during the next 3 years both sides would desist." The Chancellor thus maintains that it would serve the cause of peace if, for 3 years, both sides were to desist from emplacing new medium range weapons. He will not propose a formal treaty in Moscow. The Americans are not bothered by a mere appeal to the Soviets to refrain from the further emplacement of SS-20 rockets.

"Now what?" "Now we should let the wounds heal," says the man in the White House. Mistrust of Schmidt? "By no means. He is well aware that the most

difficult 48 hours of his political career are looming. He must display firmness without creating confrontation. He must try for an improvement in relations without appearing to be obsequious. We are relying on him completely. I for one will enjoy untroubled sleep in the night of 30 June..."

The Smiles of the Principals

The situation is the same in the U.S.State Department. In addition the diplomats are well aware that personal chemistry--the personal relations between statesmen--is less important than national interests.

An old friend of Germany commented: "Even if Jimmy and Helmut were devoted to one another, Schmidt would want to travel to Moscow, and Carter view the undertaking with some suspicion."

An expert on European affairs offered this: "In times of crisis in an alliance it is not only important to be right--one must be seen to be right. It is here that the Chancellor did not come off well. All too often he sounded as if he were defending the Russians. As a result the Americans rather than the Soviets were isolated."

A senior diplomat said: "We are approaching somber times. The Afghanistan crisis will long continue to smolder. The differences between Europe and America will grow."

No, the smile of the principals assembled in Venice must not blind us to the fact that much remains to be adjusted between Europe and America--in particular between Bonn and Washington. It will need many talks to settle how countries who are formal allies in only one corner of the globe are to react to challenges in entirely different regions.

11698

CSO: 3103

LAPLAND WINTER MANEUVERS STRESS GUERRILLA ROLE

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 7 Mar 60 p 18-21

[Article by Riitta Toivanen: "The Swamp Infantryman Has Control of Lapland"]

[Text] Finnish Lapland is an important area from a military and political point of view. The military alliances look at each other over the territory of Lapland. This is a fact.

A chilling frost, a biting wind, disheartening snowdrifts and darkness that can be cut with a knife are also facts.

The infantryman must not be surprised at anything: not even at a compass that has gone crazy, not at a mountain lake that appears to be lying on its side, and not at sleeping in a snowbank on an arctic mountain.

However, there is no lack of military exercises in the north: only recently there was the large exercise conducted by the North Finland Military District; during the same week armoured units from the south conducted firing exercises north of the Arctic Circle for the first time, and then there were the guerrilla exercises conducted by paratroopers and Lapland infantrymen; soon there will be field artillery exercises.

All of these in the snow.

Here excursions and outings in Arctic mountains is not the goal of northern military training.

In Lapland there is room to train -- and in Lapland one can encounter many large-scale difficulties.

A general from the general staff: "Lapland is a good place to observe the level of training. We observe -- and others observe. Good training is an important factor in a security policy."

Director of a special military unit: "If one can make it through Lapland, then one can get along anywhere in Finland."

A paratrooper: "This is the culmination of training. In guerrilla exercises one can expect reasonable resistance from Lapland infantrymen; elsewhere one could complain that the training is a bit slouchy."

When the paratroopers and guerrillas of the Lapland Light Infantry Brigade exercise together, many soldiers admit that it resembles an exercise conducted by select troops.

When a paratrooper runs into a guerrilla, he has already been well trained. In the south, in Uti, he has done many jumps in the dark, he has carried a 30-40 kilo pack on his back for several months already, he has studied about snow huts, he has learned about snares and the nature of the north.

An infantryman of the north knows without saying: one does not fool around with Lapland.

In the Morning

Lt. Col. Olavi Jokela, director of the paratrooper school, had made a jump the previous evening with his troops onto Lake Kallio in Kittila. The week-long exercise was conducted in the wilderness.

"The 10-man patrols are on their own. The Lapland soldier offers sufficient opposition. Their speed is not hampered by snow, ice, or darkness.

"Here the new recruit learns much more in practice than there is time to even teach in class. We learn and experience."

The paratrooper is continuously included in equipment testing: footwear, jackets, and even natural boots have been tested. What is suitable for a guerrilla, is suitable for all recruits.

A soldier who is to spend a long time in the woods must be properly equipped. Misery can be learned without being taught.

"The terrain must never become too foreign for the Finnish recruit. The defense forces must not become an institution for free-time exercising. The men must be prepared for difficult times also."

Sometimes the training has been rather venturesome: Once the beginning recruit has gone through the sauna, the dining room, and the stock room, he was immediately sent out into the woods for 2 weeks.

"The age groups are becoming smaller. Thus it becomes a waste of time to keep them occupied in peeling potatoes and pulling guard duty.

"Paratrooper training requires a full 11-month period of schooling. How then in some units does an individual become a select soldier in 3 months?"

The Red Beret is worn by a professional: in a 24-hour period he must cover 50 kilometers in difficult terrain with a full set of gear, he must be able to withstand 3 consecutive nights without sleep.

The training in the wilderness of Lapland is the final test.

The measure of the man is tested in the terrain of the Arctic mountains of Aakunus and Levi. The pace must be kept up: each paratrooper is a volunteer, behind him at least 20 jumps, several consecutive nights in the wood, body testing punishment.

Volunteers can always be found: a group of 100 men can be culled from a group of 300-400 applicants.

In the Daytime

During the night the guerrilla patrol has telegraphed a message: We are awaiting aid from point P in the direction of 35, 2 kilometers, 11 o'clock. Ski is broken.

Sgt. Kalle Savolahti goes out to help the unit. After a long period of signaling a man skis out of the woods. Along with the broken ski comes a broken man: Sgt. Jorma Lopenen from Mikkeli has hurt his shoulder.

"How far did the patrol move during the night?" "What was it? We skied along icy paths -- probably 15 kilometers. The pace was fast, there were many curves in the terrain. Together with the backpack it wasn't easy. When we left, the backpack weighed 43.5 kilos.

"According to the map the distance is at least 26 kilometers.

"But being in good shape makes the distance feel like nothing."

In many countries paratroopers are professional soldiers. Finland is building this expertise on the basis of the recruit.

"It is difficult to compare the level of training, but in Finland one is taught to be on a first name basis with nature. There are many of wooded kilometers between May -and March."

Jorma Lopenen went into the paratroopers because of the strenuous training, passed the test, and was selected. Not everyone is as successful: several applicants attempted the course without being able to swim, jumped bravely into the pool, but no miracle happened. The man was fished out of the water and the test concluded there.

"After one has completed this course, it is possible to trust in oneself."

The instructors believe that applicants are attracted by the very harshness of the course itself. Doing service as a recruit is reasonably difficult, the paratroopers jumps are an adventure, success under difficult conditions shores up one's self-confidence, and the Red Beret on one's head is a sign of pride.

"After completing this training, there is very little in the civilian world which would cause one to be flustered."

There has never been a lack of instructors: the same men stay on and 10 percent of each group of graduates want to make the armed forces a career.

In the Evening

Capt. Kalle Schroderus is the commander of the "Sutta" unit of the Lapland Light Infantry Brigade's guerrilla company.

The captain speeds off with his snowmobile from the mountainside to the Totovaara Camp. The guerrillas are brought in from many directions. Dusk is approaching.

"It is indeed difficult to corral all these men. When the snow is packed hard enough to carry a person only a presentiment is left; indeed snow drifts there is a chance."

The infantrymen get a handicap from the wilderness.

"The Lapland Light Infantry Brigade is a unit capable of carrying out a task. It is well equipped and is not afraid of the surprises Lapland has to offer."

The brigade obtained its recruits from the provinces of Lapland and Oulu. The majority has a basic idea and knowledge of the barrenness of the terrain in Lapland.

"Training becomes easier and more effective when there is no need to teach the recruit how to use a knife. When a man is from Kittila, Enontekio, or Sodankyla, it is already a certainty."

The light infantry brigade spends a lot of time in the woods. Training in the woods for the guerrilla company takes up at least half of the time spent on training.

Only the best are accepted as guerrillas. If the recruit is by profession a hunter or a reindeer herder, he is likely to be found in the guerrilla company.

When a man from Lapland returns to civilian life, he continues a life in the wilderness, but perhaps with a slightly different outlook.

Next Week

When the paratroopers escape the guerrilla troops, after a short rest they are then dropped onto the treeless mountains around Enontekio.

A second test begins: how to manage above the tree line according to nature's terms.

"After the men have spent a week becoming familiar with the mountainside, they are surprised. One does not need to quietly expire under barren and miserable conditions; one can learn to live with the mountains.

Maj. Heikki Siirpaa says that a man learns quickly to sleep in the snow and obtain nourishment from nature.

"The patrol receives fishing hooks and trap line. They attempt to catch ptarmigan and fish from the lakes.

"A decent snow cave will guarantee warm dreams. Even though it is 30-40° below zero outside, the temperature in the snow cave can be around zero.

"Many things must be experienced before they are to be believed. Survival on a treeless mountain is one of these things that a paratrooper must experience."

In the Near Future

The parliamentary defense committees have directed the development of the defense forces in the 1970's. The third committee states the truth to the Army: the emphasis of the previous two committees was on the material development of the Air Force and the Navy.

"The Army has been given less attention," admits Defense Minister Lasse Aikas.

"Indeed the ability of the Army to function has been improved in recent years, but there are still many deficiencies.

"The mobility and fire power of the troops should be modernized: for example, means of transportation more suitable to the terrain as well as anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons should be renewed. The development of winter equipment would improve the effectiveness of the individual soldier."

Defense Minister Aikas emphasizes that together with the development of the Army complimentary development must also be given to the Navy and the Air Force. The execution of the procurement decisions of the 1970's will continue for several more years.

"The third parliamentary defense committee was organized last December and its term will come to a conclusion at the end of this year. The results of the work of this committee will be seen in the field in the years 1982-1983.

"The development of the Army does not just occur with the flick of a wrist, but a time table of change takes many years."

The third parliamentary defense committee requests an evaluation of Finland's security policy situation and how defense capability can be developed over the long run. Proposals will cover the years 1982-1986.

Good Training Is a Policy of Security

Infantry Inspector and Maj. Gen. Raimo Viita considers the level of military training to be an important factor in our security policy.

"A domestic or foreign observer is capable of evaluating the effectiveness of troops. In order to have an effective preventive force, training must be of a sufficient level and quantity."

Hard training and exercises test the ability of troops; daily strain and effort must become an integral part of the soldier during training.

"Halfway through training a unit must be able to traverse 50-60 kilometers of terrain in a day and a half to 2 days. One's health should not fail from this.

"Reservists recall this difficult training with pleasure -- difficult training and exercises are frequently also the best. The ideal exercise lasts several days. During a short period of time it is possible to exceed one's limits and ability; the real mettle of troops can be seen over the long haul."

Raimo Viita emphasizes that in Finland there are no special select units.

"The requirements are the same from the north to the south. Naturally, the individual from the north, for example, is able to withstand the cold better, but the young man from the south, on the other hand, does better in other things.

"Reservists do surprisingly well in difficult military exercises -- even better than the recruits after several days of training. The reservists accept training as a job with a sense of responsibility."

Desired Assignments By Means of Tests

Red Berets, coastal infantrymen, frogmen...

A few assignments in the defense forces require more training and ability than others. No one is forced into such units.

"Entry into specialized units is accomplished on a volunteer basis. Volunteers are sufficient: for example, only one-third of the applicants to the paratrooper school could be accepted. Also demanding tests are given before an individual is given special training."

General Viita believes that people are interested in the Red Beret because of its reputation: "An individual entitled to wear the Red Beret has an increased sense of self respect and also respect from those around him.

"I consider it natural that one can find individuals who are not afraid of difficult training and stiff requirements. The men indeed come to terms with nature on a first name basis and above all learn how to jump with a parachute.

"The difference from that of a recruit in a regular unit is not decisively different."

Differences in Ability Have Evened Out

Previously a university student entering the service was in general helpless and heavy training would cause him to gasp for air.

"Now the differences between recruits have evened out: the educational level has improved and physical differences have evened out."

Gen. Viita believes that the new recruit adapts to life in the field very quickly.

"A Finn continues to know how to ski, for example. The learning of other skills also goes well since the majority of Finnish recruits have a positive attitude toward national defense when entering the service."

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CSO: 3107

FRG REASSURED ON FRENCH ECONOMIC OPTIONS

LD070925 Paris LE MONDE in French 22-23 Jun 80 p 2

[Trier Dispatch by Jean Wetz on French Prime Minister Raymond Barre 20 June speech to the Association of FRG Chambers of Commerce and Industry: "Mr Barre Explained to Industrialists His Concept of an A La Carte Europe"]

[Excerpt] Mr Barre's main task was to explain to leaders of the West German economy and finance the French Government's views on the future of the EC, since this was the theme of the meeting of chambers of commerce and industry.

Mr Barre explained his concept of a "multi-speed" Europe. First, however, he very clearly reaffirmed the principles of the community whose "real basis," he believes, is the "contract" linking free circulation of industrial products with a genuine common market in agricultural products. It would appear, therefore, that the crisis has given rise to the following fundamental question: "Does the fact that we want to see an organized community mean that all member states must do everything simultaneously and in the same way? Is it impossible to conceive different functional groups, similar to those which we have created in connection with the European monetary system, in such a big entity as a 12-member community would constitute?"

Struggle Against Inflation

As for the problem of enlargement, Mr Barre certainly acknowledges Spain's and Portugal's right to "the place reserved for them by history." However, he also mentioned common sense in support of his statement that "it is impossible to negotiate seriously" with the two countries in question until the community clarifies its own budget mechanisms and earmarks resources "to make it possible to finance the tasks which would spring from a southward expansion of the community."

The prime minister had to admit that the common agricultural policy conceived 20 years ago has become obsolete. Since the community's financial resources are not inexhaustible, it seems that the time has come to "jointly seek the dispositions which must and can be taken with respect

to the community's management method, without modifying any of the fundamental principles on which it has been built--peace, unity, financial solidarity and community preferences." More specifically, Mr Barre stated that guarantees granted for agricultural settlements "could not continue to ignore the scale of production and market prospects."

Earlier, Mr Barre took the opportunity offered to justify to West German business circles the policy which he has pursued for nearly 4 years. He expressed the view that the results of his activities would certainly prove positive both with respect to the struggle against inflation and to French industry's adaptation to the new conditions stemming from the "oil shock."

However, certain questions are being asked in FRG industrial and political circles. Why has France been unable to reduce the rate of consumer goods price increases below a 10-percent threshold, even though it has pursued a policy similar to that pursued by the Germans? Even though it is true, Mr Barre believes, that in 1980 the effects of the second "oil shock" in themselves account for three points of the price rise, some other, deeper reasons have prevented France from adopting the "German model." First of all, it would have been politically and psychologically impossible to reduce the French people's purchasing power without giving rise to a social explosion. Furthermore, Mr Barre stated, France is the only major European country in which 250,000 new people arrive on the labor market every year. This has forced the government to maintain a growth rate which has not dropped below 3 percent since 1977. And, finally, it would be too difficult to reduce budget support for "a large agriculture and a very wide public sector."

Mr Barre also made a special report to assuage concern felt on this side of the Rhine about the future of the European monetary system. According to him, disparity between inflation rates is not the only factor to be considered. "What people forget only too often, even in Germany," he asserted, "is that the exchange rate between the currencies of two countries does not exclusively depend on respective inflation rates; it also depends on the state of current balances of payments and productivity rates." It seems, therefore, that the will to protect the franc is based on "strong objective factors."

Mr Barre was of course warmly applauded by the industrialists gathered in Trier when he stated that Franco-German cooperation "remains the cornerstone of Western Europe's unification venture." He believes that the fact that "our two countries attach similar importance to monetary stability and the market economy" is of fundamental importance.

CSO: 3100

EDITOR ANALYZES PASOK PARTY ACTIVITIES, FUTURE PROSPECTS

Next General Elections

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 1 Jun 80 p 1

[Text] "We must provide a clarification regarding Andreas Papandreu. First, with reference to the past: Andreas Papandreu is the one person most responsible for the decomposition of our democratic system during the years 1964-67. Andreas Papandreu blew up and destroyed the democratic institutions. He was the one who led the country to an explosive impasse and caused his old father so much sorrow and distress. Andreas Papandreu killed the democratic system. The 21 April (dictatorship) only buried it.

"We had given Andreas Papandreu advance warning at that time. We proved to him mathematically that he was pushing the country toward a dictatorship. Neither did he listen to us nor did he pay any attention to George Papandreu. He knew more than political science which we used in analysing the Greek reality and more than his father's long experience. He turned a deaf ear. The inevitable happened as a necessary consequence of Andreas Papandreu's political extremism: The democratic institutions were paralyzed and crumbled to the ground."

ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS, 11 August 1974

The question is not raised by ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS. It was raised a few days ago during the press conference held by Premier G. Rallis for the foreign correspondents in Athens. A public debate followed on the editorial pages of newspapers, and we are now joining this debate.

The exchange between the questioning journalist and G. Rallis is as follows according to the Press Ministry text:

"M. MONDIANO ([LONDON] TIMES): Mr. Premier, I feel almost ashamed to have to ask you about domestic matters inasmuch as all previous questions concerned external affairs. The most important feature of a constitutional democracy is the normal rotation to power. I would like to ask you if

you could state that the guarantees for such normal interchange exist in Greece, in view of certain reservations expressed by government officials during the recent debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the question whether the opposition party would possibly install a one-party system if it came to power. It has been said, that is, that this opposition would install a one-party system if it came to power.

"ANSWER: You cannot say such a thing now. The change must be made first and then stated afterwards. In many parts of the world the governing party has doubts whether change will benefit the country. It is very natural as well as certain that all of us who believe in the New Democracy [Party] believe that the interest of the country is better protected with the New Democracy remaining in power, provided of course that it is supported at the polls by the majority of the Greek people. Of course, some people have greater fears and others lesser ones about a possible change--some see a possible change as very dangerous and others less dangerous. What we all agree on is that the country's interest is better assured if the Greek people vote again for the New Democracy Party.

"M. MONDIANO (LONDON TIMES): If the Greek voters decide to vote the opposition party [Panhellenic Socialist of A. Papandreou] is there a guarantee--you, being the government, can say--that it will assume power in a normal way?

"ANSWER: There is no doubt that if a party other than the New Democracy wins the election, this wish of the Greek people will be fulfilled. This is democracy. Is it possible to say that democracy exists only when this or that party is in power? Democracy means the free election of the government by the people. If someone else is elected, he will assume the governing of the country."

According to Premier Rallis, if PASOK wins a majority in the next election, it will take over the governing of the country because this is what the democratic system dictates. We must wait until it assumes the government to see if it will establish a single-party system; in other words, if it will terminate the democratic system or not. The premier oversimplified the issue by his statement and in so doing served the interests of PASOK.

Before we proceed, however, with a presentation of our views on this matter it is necessary to review briefly the various aspects of the problem,

and above all to remind our readers what PASOK stands for. How does Papandreu see the role of his party? On this we have an authoritative document. It is his. He has never repudiated it.

In April 1974, while in Paris, A. Papandreu gave an interview to the respected French review, NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. In his view, the socialists ought to establish everywhere, in every country, an invisible, secret and illegal militant machinery before they assume power through elections. As soon as the socialists win the election and assume the government, their secret machinery should suddenly be set in motion and attack the state with its armed force. In this way, according to the Papandreu formula, the single-party state of the socialists will be established and the opponents of socialism will be neutralized forever.

Here is what A. Papandreu was saying to the French periodical:

"The electoral victory of the Left does not mean the Left will assume power. You enter the ministerial buildings and then what? You need to take over the government from the hands of those people who are defending it and who have force at their disposal. The ministers of defense and interior in a leftist government barely have the power to impose their will on those aides they have brought in with them. The system, you see, is autonomous, tied only to the interests of the dominant class.

"We must keep in mind that this collision is inevitable and that we must begin to prepare for it now. We must immediately establish illegal action groups capable of fighting back against the forces of the bourgeois state and to impose the legitimate power of the government. This is not something that can be organized in a few days. It takes years to build illegal networks of resistance. We must possess autonomous means of communication, guidance at all levels, men who are both trained and determined. Compared to the bourgeoisie, we socialists are like the 'natives' with bows and arrows in front of the machine guns of the colonialists. We are weak and naive."

Needless to say, no socialist in Western Europe accepted the Papandreu formula. He himself, however, has upheld it ever since, because even though repeatedly challenged he never repudiated it. Conclusion: A. Papandreu represents a coup following his electoral victory.

PASOK as Government

Athens ~~ELFVTHROS~~ KOSMOS in Greek 3 Jun 80 pp 1, 16

/Text/ What is the political character of PASOK? What is the picture of Greek reality offered by Andreas Papandreu? And what content does he give to the efforts of PASOK in order to change that reality? Only after one has given a sound reply to these questions can one judge Premier Kallis' response that if the majority of the people vote for PASOK power will have to be turned over to Andreas Papandreu and that then we must be patient and wait and see if PASOK as government will impose a one-party system. PASOK's political structure is based on three basic assumptions. They constitute the foundation of its policy, its major features, its backbone.

The first assumption: Greece does not have a nation - a l s t a t e. Governments and public servants are Washington's mercenaries. The country is governed and administered by a "fifth column" controlled by the Pentagon. The government is not of the Greek people but of the United States. The government officials are "commissioners" carrying out the orders of the American government which is the real government of Greece.

The civil service is manned by American agents. The administrative officials, the judges, the police and the officers of the armed forces all serve only the American interest. They have no Greek consciousness. They are some kind of genitars (renegades). They speak Greek but they think American and Nato-like. And since the United States follows a pro-Turkish policy, Greece's government and state machinery help Washington, sacrificing their nation in exchange for the 30 pieces of silver Judas received. A. Papandreu is training the followers of PASOK to hate the state and to wish its demolition.

The second Papandreu assumption logically follows the first: Greece is under foreign occupation. It is not an independent country but in essence it is occupied by a foreign power. All governments and state employees of all categories are collaborators of the conqueror. They are Quislings and "dosilogoι" /people with tainted pasts --an epithet used for Nazi collaborators/. The conqueror now is America just as fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were the conquerors in 1941-44. According to PASOK, American imperialism is a variation of fascism. The Greek people live under a foreign yoke. They are under foreign domination. Washington is oppressing them. Government, armed forces, justice, security forces and all other branches of the state play the role assigned to them by the United States. They are "the Occupation Forces" that have caused so much anguish to the Greek people in the past.

It is not difficult to guess the next, third Papandreu assumption: The Greek people have a duty to wage a national liberation struggle. There is in psychology the law of

sequence of impressions. When you speak of "occupation" you automatically think of "resistance," armed struggle against the conqueror, the "national liberation struggle." This is exactly PASOK's rallying call. By saying that Greece is a country under foreign occupation and that the Greek state is manned by a swarm of Quislings, it creates the disposition and the passion of struggle against an abominable and unbearable situation. It is a martial call. It is a declaration of war.

But in Greece there are no U.S. troops. The American bases have a very limited number of men. The foreign occupation which according to PASOK exists in Greece is carried out by Greeks. The agent of occupation is the state itself (political parties, civil servants, officers of the armed forces, etc.). Consequently, the "national liberation struggle" will be carried out by Greeks against Greeks. In other words, will it be a civil war? The nation will be divided. A. Papandreu has coined a new term: "the hellenisation of the state." This word means destruction of the existing state and its replacement by a state of some other kind. PASOK is deeply influenced by what has happened in some Arab countries (Algeria, Libya, Iraq) where the one-party system prevails. PASOK wants to transplant this system into Greece.

Relying exclusively on the Papandreu and PASOK texts we are forced to conclude that if the present opposition party [PASOK] came to power we would have two results. First, PASOK as government would carry out a coup to eliminate the forces which now support the state structure (armed forces, security corps) which will be replaced by party-dominated organs. Second, the new partisan state will unleash a headhunt for civil servants, ordinary citizens and political personalities in an atmosphere of slander, denunciations, intrigue, false accusations, staged trials, blackmail, murders and all kinds of persecutions. Within days Greece would pass into a regime of oppression and bloodshed. The Middle East would enter the Greek area and set the tone in the new situation.

And now one may ask: If the majority of the Greek people gave their support to PASOK, what should be done? Premier Rallis said: The government will be turned over to A. Papandreu because this is what democracy dictates. The premier is wrong. He seems to be unaware that democracy, according to political science, does not deal with the problem in the fashion he suggests. Premier Rallis also said that once PASOK assumes the government of the country we will find out if A. Papandreu will show respect for the democratic system or not. But will we be there to find out? And what will we be able to do at that time? Are we not going to be like the Trojans who led the wooden horse inside the walls and went to bed to sleep unconcerned?

NEW MONEYMARTET MEASURES CONSOLIDATED

Athens HELLENIC NEWS EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 p 2

[Text] The Ministry of Finance has consolidated in a circular the measures introduced by Law 876/79 for assisting the development of a money market and, in particular, investment in Stock Exchange values.

- a) at least 35% of net Company profit must be distributed as dividend.
- b) dividend earned from investment in any single Company's shares is now tax-free up to Dr 25,000 per annum while dividend earned from shares in several Companies is tax-free up to Dr 100,000 but, in both cases, the shares in question must be among those quoted on the Stock Exchange.
- c) when a Company increases its share capital according to law, tax withheld from dividend for distribution is reduced by five units.
- d) capitalisation of tax-free reserve funds, retained in accordance with existing economic development regulations, can be made upon payment of a 10% tax only.
- e) total taxable income of individuals is reduced by amounts spent for the purchase of Company shares and the same applies for the purchase of bonds or of shares in investment portfolio and mutual fund Companies.

The same circular clarifies tax rebates allowed on income from interest earned on bonds issued by various public utility corporations, from bank promissory notes and bond loans.

CSO: 4920

NEW INTEREST RATES REPORTED

Athens HELLENES EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] On Saturday 21st June, Mr. J. Boutos, Minister of Coordination, announced one more of the promised economic measures.

--interest for bank financing of industry and of commerce becomes unified at a common rate, 23.5% per annum.

--interest paid by banks on savings account deposits remains unchanged.

--a new form of long-term deposit is introduced on which interest up to 22% per annum can be paid. This involves deposits worth Drs 1,000,000 or more for not less than a year.

--long-term grants from banks will be charged with 2.5% more interest than at present "in order to restore a better ratio towards short-term borrowing interests and discourage present tendencies to evade repayment of instalments".

--demurrage interest on long-term loans is raised 2% above interest applicable at any time for operating funds.

--the period during which an export deal can be financed in advance is reduced by one month.

--interest paid on promissory notes or bonds issued by investment portfolio companies is raised to 23%.

--the new system of free interest rates for US Dollar and Pound Sterling deposits will allow banks to offer interest up to 1% above Euromarket rates. In addition, depositors who accept interest in Drachma on such deposits will receive 1.5% more interest.

--housing loans granted against importation of foreign currency have their ceiling lifted from the present Drachmae 2,000,000 to a new Drs 3,500,000 limit no restriction being placed on the number of dwellings to be bought with such funds.

In general, the new rates are not retroactive but will apply to outstanding portions of loans granted for operating funds.

It is the Government's stated intention to free interest rates altogether but this cannot happen before October next, at the earliest. No reason was stated.

CSO: 4920

EXPORTERS INCREASINGLY WORRIED, URGE SUBSIDIZATION

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 p 5

[Text] Exporters are growing increasingly restive. The Hellenic Exporters Association has had successive meetings with the Ministers of Co-ordination and of Finance and the Association itself held a general meeting on Monday, 23rd June. January-April receipts from exports were a bare 4.5% higher than those of the same four months in 1979, which, after price inflation is taken into account, means in reality a substantial fall.

Both the Government and the exporters accept this as a fact. Greek export firms report cancellations of orders, increased instances of payment defaults on the part of their overseas customers, delays in collection of other moneys and lack of operating funds, made worse by Government reluctance in meeting its obligation to refund export interest subsidies about which much has been written in the past.

The Government, in recent years, has allowed it to be understood that it just could not spare the funds to meet these debts explaining it to the exporters on the 20th of this month. There were, once more, assurances that the Government "would reinforce exports and would expedite all procedures in that direction", but the official announcement about the meeting contained little of a concrete nature. It spoke of "the appropriate solutions having been given", but nothing has changed in practice.

The exporters are asking for:

--prompt payment to them of the export interest refunds owed by the Government and automatic deduction of such refunds at every future export transaction,

--immediate abolition of the retention of a contribution to the Farmers' Pension Fund (OGA) on farm products bought wholesale for export,

--no increase in interest paid on financing of exports and continuation of advance financing of exports,

--continuation of the refund of export interests, as per Currency Committee Decision 1574 until VAT has been introduced into Greece, and, at any rate, not less than the whole of 1981,

--an end to all confusion of State social policy towards the farming community with exports of farm products.

The Association pointed out that, to subsidize exports is far more economical than attempting to generate foreign currency earnings from any other source.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

OFF-SHORE DRILLING--The Public Petroleum Corporation (DEP in Greek) has been able to charter the Danish off-shore drilling ship "Dan Barrow" for 18-24 months in order to carry out drilling for oil on the Greek continental shelf along the Ionian seaboard. Work will begin in January 1981. It is hoped in the space of the two years in question to bore five to eight holes in search of oil. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 p 5]

SALES FORTNIGHTS--The Deputy Minister of Trade, Mr. Tataridis, last week expressed the view that "sales fortnights" should be permissible all through the year provided that prior application to the competent authority has been made by each shop or chain of shops concerned. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 p 5]

TRADE WITH ARABS--The Second Greek-Arab Trade Meeting, highlighted by the Greek Export Product Exhibition at the Zappeion Hall, ended on the 22nd of this month. Hundreds of Arab visitors attended and were able to establish direct contact with Greek manufacturers and suppliers. The practical value of these personal acquaintances was seen during and after the last year's First Greek-Arab Trade Meeting and this year's event was a build-up on the foundations set last year. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 26 Jun 80 p 5]

CSO: 4920

AR DISSIDENTS WANT VAN AGT'S DOWNFALL

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 31 May 80 pp 14-21

[Report by Rene De Bok and Frank Lafort: "AR Dissidents Want To Bring Down Van Agt"]

[Text] The AR [Antirevolutionary Party] following's verdict on the political dissidents has come down hard. Embitterment in enlightened circles has mounted high. Plans are being forged to break up the conservative bulwark around Dan Agt and to open the way for a CDA/PvdA [Christian Democratic Appeal/Labor Party] coalition. The CDA is in turmoil. The campaign platform, which was worked out in deepest secrecy, reveals a Christian Democratic current which goes right along with the Socialists. The conceptual program is a clear invitation to the PvdA and an important component of the scenario in which Van Agt is liquidated politically. Elsevier reports.

DDA Platform an Invitation to the PvdA

Outside the ARP the reviling of the AR dissidents came as a complete surprise. But the course correction of itself is nothing to be shocked at. What is surprising is that in past years progressively oriented ARP politicians have been able to get away with creating the impression that the ARP was a left-leaning party which sought new, radical paths towards social reform. The suggestion was created that the evangelium was a flag that no longer covered the political load. The upward thrust of the people towards a greater, more elevated ideal of equality seemed to stand up, but that, too, was a sad delusion.

After the nuclear arms debate in December last year [1979], in which the AR dissidents lost gracelessly, the enlightened AR circle showed its true face: powerless, discouraged, devoid of any political future. The only weapon with which the dissidents still fenced was the party following: in

it they still perceived "important currents which shared their concern about the extent of the arms race between the East and the West."

But in the wake of the nuclear arms debate, another view of the ARP came to light, an ARP that slowly was coming to be willing no longer to carry the burden of a misguided progressiveness any further. More conservatively oriented ARP members in the Second Chamber, like Schakel and Van Dam, decided to counter-attack. Schakel called on the ARP voters to defend themselves mightily in the selection of candidates in order "to put an end to the alienation between the ARP delegation and the ARP voters." Schakel called "the delegation more radical than the party leadership and the party leadership more radical than the party members."

Schakel had a better feel for how the spirit of the ARP had developed than the self-deceived group of dissidents in the Second Chamber. The spirit of the ARP had changed little since World War II, just as the basic principles of the party formed by Abraham Kuyper had undergone very little wear and tear in the course of a century. The ARP still feels the call to fulfill a role of importance in national politics. Its evangelical basis is the primary reason for ARP voters to turn to Van Agt as their political leader.

The ARP dissidents have been reduced to a group of political exiles. That this concept seems slowly to be getting through to the initially so haughty dissidents themselves can be seen from the attempt they are still making to turn the tide. In those attempts they have directed their political aggression primarily at Prime Minister Van Agt. According to the latest opinion polls, which are just as favorable to Van Agt as they are unfavorable to Den Uyl, the prospect of a second Van Agt cabinet is staring us in the face. In view of his statements in Kalimantan, Van Agt, too, does not find that prospect unwelcome. His triple yes, to being standard bearer, to a second round as prime minister and to the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], fills the dissident group of ARP members with great concern. They will only be able to fulfil a key function in national politics if a coalition is brought about between the CDA and the PvdA. In that arrangement, Van Agt is persona non grata. And therefore the group of dissidents wants his political liquidation.

In that perspective, the scenario looks as follows: this spring an attempt will be made to defeat the cabinet. Possibilities for this are offered by the budget discussions in which Van Agt will some time have to take a stand. After the programed fall of the government, Lubbers will be put forward as standard bearer as a compromise figure in the formation of a new Den Uyl cabinet.

That dissident ARP members, although not yet in conclave with the opposition, are playing with the idea of letting loose a palace revolution within the CDA bulwark is illustrated by two indications:

The first indication is dissident Jan Van Houwelingen's statement on VARA [Workers' Radio Amateurs Association, the PvdA radio organ] radio program "In de Rooie Haan" [In the Red Rooster], in which he developed the idea of a premature end to the Van Agt cabinet's term. While he left it open whether the initiative for that would come from the cabinet itself or the cabinet would be brought down, Van Houwelingen said that in general it is not common that a cabinet says, we will step down. In that, Van Houwelingen unmistakably put forward the suggestion that the cabinet will be pushed aside with united forces, and how would such a thing be possible without the cooperation of the dissident group of ARP members?

The second indication is the proposed campaign platform, which is a clear invitation to the PvdA.

"One does not so much remember a political movement by the particular answers to the many questions as by the problems that it recognizes and by the characteristic manner in which it approaches them." This philosophy, reinforced with concepts like solidarity, responsibility, controlling interest rates and justice, was published by Dr J. Kremers' CDA commission in a report about the political persuasion of the Christian Democrats. In view of the fact that one exerts little if any attraction on the voters with "penetrating" basic texts, the divided Christian Democratic bloc has been bearing down hard on a common campaign platform for the past year.

The CDA concept presents problems but it gives no answers, answers that would present awkward consequences for a number of sacred cows cherished by the socialists. In avoiding hard consequences, the CDA is playing into the hand of the socialists.

In June the platform, which will be the stakes in the new elections, must be presented to the party. The successor to Professor Goudzwaard in the CDA platform committee, Professor Vermaat, was assigned the task of explaining to the heterogeneous Christian Democratic society how the "liberties and standards" as characterized by CDA chairman Steenkamp can be welded together into a new governing coalition.

"The central question for me as an economist," says Steenkamp, "is how we must steer our economy, with all of its autonomous firms and individuals, in the direction of higher employment, changing the income relationships, re-distributing power, authority and so on." No simple task, in that the majority of these "democratization wisher" are closely coupled to everything associated with the Dutch economy.

As one of the biggest political parties in the Netherlands, the CDA is confronted with the weaknesses of our political system. According to CDA chairman Steenkamp, we are not in a position to integrate groupings and their demands into political democracy; "It is the crisis of democracy itself."

A crisis that has saddled the electorate with high-pitched expectations and an economic hangover. A new governing team--the election campaign opens unofficially in June when the CDA and the PvdA present their campaign platforms--will then start out on a new 4-year term with a headache.

CDA delegation chairman Lubbers pointed out a few painful stretches last week in the NRC [Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant] HANDELSBLAD when he presented a few rough lines from the proposed socioeconomic paragraph without arousing comment. Lubbers: "In our postindustrial welfare, the combination of education and democratization, of social provisions and professional fixation lead clearly to a situation in which the involvement of the man in the work falls short. That has now become the central socioeconomic question."

The CDA leader pays homage to the extension of the PvdA philosophy for the short term, the theory of the "economy of enough" in which the (re-) employment of the labor force in the production process gets first priority. Within the CDA, they are thinking of another 70,000 people annually, of whom at least 25,000 should be WAOers [Law on Labor Disability beneficiaries]. Against this background, there is serious thought in CDA circles of no longer allowing employment opportunity aspects to determine WAO eligibility, but to determine that solely on medical grounds. The only thing not yet clear is what results that will have on the benefits to the WAOers. After all, if one is declared 30 percent medically disabled, one receives a payment of only 30 percent. In practice, that will mean a loss of income of at least 50 percent. (The WAO is 80 percent of the salary last enjoyed, limited to a maximum of about 40,000 guilders.) In order to bring about this (re-) employment, according to the CDA philosophy, there would have to be a great deal of "regionalization" and "decentralization" in the labor market. In that it is clear that the Christian Democrats want to set themselves apart from the monopolistic position the central government has assumed in the labor market through its labor bureaus. In this area, employers and workers would have to be given much more influence on the regional level. The scope for this decentralization policy would have to be defined in a law on the employment of labor, in which, according to the way the CDA sees things, obligatory minimum percentages of hirings must not be excluded in order to give women, youths and (ex-) WAOers a chance in the labor market.

Another idea that Lubbers also stressed is the integration of various payments into a new system. (Particularly the WW [Unemployment Law], the RWW [National Group Regulation for Unemployed Workers] and the WWV [Law on Unemployment Provisions].) This will be a new arrangement based on the so-called De Graaf plan, in which there is talk of a basic provision for everyone, but in which the element of need is kept in view by means of supplements. The only question is whether the new arrangement can be realized in a short time.

The tight spots in the labor market, so says the CDA, must not be met by admitting more foreign workers. In order to have these "bottlenecks"

disappear, the CDA pleads for an adjustment of the concept of "acceptable work," and especially for youths.

By all of these measures, which are directed towards the (re-) employment of the labor force, there is an attempt to call a halt to the still ever-expanding collective sector. The CDA says all forces must be mobilized to reduce the call on social services. This struggle is drastically necessary in order to keep the financing shortage of the government from mounting above 5 percent (this figure is also flourished in the coalition agreement between the CDA and the VVD).

A new idea, which the CDA says can be realized in a short time and which will not be unwelcome in the socialist camp, is a council for income policy. This agency, created specifically for the practitioners of the learned professions, will have to make fee proposals. In the "economy of enough" this category of workers and social partners will have to reckon with marginal income improvements or nothing at all over the long term because economic growth is stagnating. Therefore, for the CDA the so-called "incidentals" (extra "periodic" pay increases, bonuses, etc.) are a continuing source of sorrow. Thus employers and workers must do everything to keep this cost level from blowing up, even though not in concert with the industry councils.

While according to the CDA everyone must reckon with the zero level over the long term, a study will have to be made as to whether the "sharply" progressive income taxes cannot be lowered. Such a step is welcome in the CDA because it would strengthen the morals of taxing and improve the tax system. On the other hand, tax evasion and the improper use of social services must be attacked more strongly, the CDA says, and they call for better coordination of information from the investigative officials. There still seem to be difficulties with the establishment of a Social Intelligence and Investigation Service.

Inflation is the deadly enemy of our society, the more so because it frustrates tax levies. Therefore the CDA continues to call for inflation-neutral legislation a la Hofstra, even though that naturally must not be done at the expense of private home ownership. Therefore the CDA says that care must be taken that the interest deduction for the first private residence must be maintained for the most part. (The Van Amelsfoort motion calls for a limit of 400,000 guilders.)

Critics of the CDA's conceptual program feel that it incorporates insufficient guarantees to prevent the extra gas profits from once more disappearing into the collective sector in a short time. In that respect, too, the PvdA was clearly respected. There were indications, among other things, of another monster like the Law on Adjustment Mechanisms in the Minimum Wage and Social Security Payments (AMS) in which a colossal apparatus of indexing mechanisms was brought about which coupled all the incomes in the

incomes in the Netherlands to one another. The AMS is one of the weaknesses pointed out by Steenkamp.

The question is whether this new CDA campaign platform which has been adjusted to the wishes of the PvdA provides a good answer to the "crisis of democracy" prophesied by Steenkamp. In the CDA, they can still always dig in behind the Kremers committee's statement that one "does not so much remember a political movement by the particular answers to the many questions," but over the long term, the Netherlands does, indeed, have need of these answers. Therefore it would be good if the CDA, along with their campaign platform, were to present a financial program as well, in which the costs as well as the benefits were clearly illustrated. Only then would the CDA have a campaign platform which would really put the electorate fully in the picture. But in order to hold the door open so wide to the PvdA that they could drive a truck through it, the CDA has not dared to take that step. In that respect, the CDA's conceptual program also fits into the scenario for unseating Van Agt prematurely.

6940

CSO: 3105

PARTIES START PREPARATIONS FOR MAY 1981 ELECTIONS

Van Agt Heads KVP Candidates

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 25 Jun 80 p 7

[Text] The Hague, June 24--Premier Dries van Agt was confirmed today as the leading candidate of his Catholic People's Party (KVP) for the elections next May.

The definitive KVP list still has to be combined with those of the Protestant Anti-Revolutionary and Christian Historical parties in a common CDA list, but the KVP as the biggest party is certain to supply the leading candidate.

Mr Ruud Lubbers, now CDA floor leader in the Second Chamber, remains second on the KVP list and Farm Minister Gerrit Brax has moved up to the third place in the final list.

Politicians who had been proposed as candidates, but have declined, are former finance minister Frans Andriessen, his successor, Mr Frans van der Stee, Sciences Minister Anthonius van Trier, defence state secretary Cees van Lent and economics state secretary Theo Hazekamp.

No Support for Van Agt Cabinet

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 26 Jun 80 p 4

[Text] Amsterdam, June 25--There would have been no majority support for a second centre-left Administration headed by Labour leader Joop den Uyl nor for a second centre-right Van Agt Administration if elections had been held last month, according to results of an opinion poll published today.

The poll, conducted by the Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (Nipo) among 1,028 Dutchmen, showed that 43 per cent favoured a second Van Agt Cabinet and only 34 per cent a second Den Uyl Cabinet.

A second Van Agt Cabinet was opposed by 47 per cent and a second Den Uyl Cabinet by 56 per cent of the respondents.

Most of the supporters of a second Van Agt Cabinet were CDA and VVD voters, respectively 83 and 71 per cent. Seventy-two per cent of the Labour voters and 47 per cent of the D'66 voters supported a second Den Uyl Cabinet.

'HOLLAND DISGRACED' OVER FAILURE TO NOMINATE EEC PRESIDENT

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 27 Jun 80 p 4

[Text] The Hague, June 26--The Government was rapped in the Second Chamber yesterday for failing to nominate a Dutchman for appointment as the new President of the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission.

The Prime Ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg nominated Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn this week as successor to Britain's Roy Jenkins when his four-year term expires in January.

Labour member Schelto Patijin described the Government's failure to nominate and throw its weight behind a Dutch candidate as 'downright disgraceful'.

He condemned the Government for having ignored a Second Chamber motion supporting the nomination of former Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel.

D'66 spokesman Laurens Brinkhorst felt the Netherlands had already lost so much face in the Community that he would not even submit a motion of disapprobation.

The Christian Democrats (CDA) spokesman, Mr Joost van Iersel, disagreed with Premier Dries van Agt that the nationality of the EEC President was of no importance but acquiesced because no suitable Dutch candidate had apparently been available.

CDA Claim

He urged the Government however to claim one of Commission seats falling vacant (finance and economics, agriculture external relations and development cooperation).

Liberal VVD spokesman Frederik Bolkestein fully endorsed the Government's handling of the nomination and claimed it was up to Labour to prove its candidate, Mr Max van der Stoel, is better than Gaston Thorn.

He criticised the Socialists for naming Mr Van der Stoel as a potential candidate at too late a stage.

Premier Van Agt told the Chamber that the presidency had not been offered to the Netherlands although most of the state and government leaders at the recent Venice summit had come out in favour of a president from one of the small member states, with a preference for one of the Benelux countries.

'Head-Start'

He said most of the leaders had favoured Thorn and this had given him a considerable head-start on any other candidates. A final decision had not however been taken in Venice, he added.

Before going to Venice and at the instigation of one of the member states Mr Van Agt had once again approached a Dutchman who had earlier declined nomination, but he had not changed his mind.

Mr Van Agt declined to say whether this was Netherlands (central) Bank Governor Jelle Zijlstra or former Dutch Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel.

But he said it had not been Mr Van der Stoep because, 'as one of the key men of the Den Uyl shadow Cabinet' he had considered him to be earmarked for other posts.

CSO: 3120

SCHOLTEN NOMINATION TO STATE COUNCIL QUESTIONED

Scholten Not First Choice

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Jun 80 pl

[Report: "Scholten Not First Choice of the State Council"]

[Text] The Hague, 26 Jun--Mr W. Scholten is not among those the State Council considers suitable for the vice presidency of the council. For that position, the actual chairmanship of the highest advisory board of the crown, Council Members Veringa and Van der Hoeven are being considered equally.

This is evident from the literal text of the statement which the oldest member of the council, Admiral L. Brouwer, made on 18 June during a meeting with Minister Wiegel (of internal affairs). Two days later Prime Minister Van Agt announced that the royal decree of the appointment of Mr W. Scholten, the current minister of defense, as deputy chairman of the State Council, had been signed that day.

The text of Brouwer's statement was sent to the Second Chamber this morning by Minister Wiegel at the request of PvdA [Labor Party] Parliamentary Group Chairman Den Uyl, after it became clear to him last night that the members of the council did not think that Minister Wiegel had done complete justice to their standpoint in the chamber debate on the appointment.

In that interpellation debate Minister Wiegel emphasized yesterday morning only that the members of the council preferred a choice from their own circle.

Yesterday afternoon after a meeting of the council, Vice President Ruppert "on behalf of the members of the council" (he himself is not a formal member) sent the literal statement of State Councillor Brouwer to the minister "in view of what was said by you and others in the Second Chamber this morning," as Ruppert wrote in an accompanying summary.

Tonight during the voting on his rejection motion, PvdA Parliamentary Group Chairman Den Uyl will request a reopening of the deliberations. The letter confirms the cause of his repeated questioning yesterday morning as to the reason why the cabinet denied the preference of the council.

Reaction to Scholten's Appointment

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Jun 80 p 7

[Text] The appointment of Minister of Defense Scholten as vice president of the State Council has led to considerable surprise and discussion inside and outside of the Second Chamber. Even the tempo alone: appointment within 3 weeks after the request for resignation by the current vice chairman. The Second Chamber devoted a debate to it yesterday in the framework of an interpellation by Mr J. M. den Uyl. His conclusion was that the appointment had not been made "with the required caution." Is all that criticism and commotion right? The answer to that must be ascertained by means of three questions. Is it justified to remove an incumbent minister from the cabinet for a nice position elsewhere? Further, can one find fault with the procedure of appointment, other than the great speed by which it was done? Finally, to what extent is Scholten's appointment a symptom of a polarizing appointment policy?

It has been definitely established since 1866 that there is not much esteem for the appointing to other posts of incumbent ministers. In decency, ministers can resign only if their health is at stake or if they are in conflict with their colleagues or the chamber.

It won't do to exchange the minister's post for another task before his period of office has expired. A cabinet is not a pigeon loft or a career path.

Now that the principle has been stated thus, reality nevertheless demands its role. When everyone still thought that the European Commission would become a true European government, promotion to it was considered acceptable. Thus in 1958 incumbent Minister Mansholt was (promoted) to Brussels. When the same thing happened in 1976 with Minister Vredeling, there was considerably less esteem, considering the loss of prestige of the European Commission since 1958. Extenuating circumstance: "Vredeling was almost "finished" with governing, because he had defended his last budget in the chamber.

This is a matter of high international positions, but no office in the Netherlands is higher than that of minister of the crown. Thus there is only one precedent for Scholten's appointment: the appointment, in 1866, of the minister of colonies, Mijer, as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. Terlouw referred to that precedent yesterday, although he was not too clear about it.

The Mijer affair, for that matter, was considerably more colorful than what has happened now. The colonial question was the pre-eminent political issue in those years and Mijer was the soul of a cabinet which had existed for only 3 months on the day of his departure. Mijer had been in the Second Chamber exactly twice, and one of those times was to defend a Dutch East Indies budget taken over from the previous cabinet. That was in June 1966 [as published].

When the chamber returned to The Hague in September, Mijer turned out to have been appointed to the Indies. It was urgent, the cabinet thought. An irate chamber debate led to the adoption of a motion submitted by the antirevolutionary Keuchenius, who denounced the procedure of the cabinet.

In constitutional literature much has been written about that motion and especially about its consequences, although not about the aspect at issue here: the moral acceptability of the resignation of a minister who is in charge of a central problem area of the cabinet policy. That makes Mijer's resignation politically objectionable to the entire chamber as well as to those who did not support the Keuchenius motion.

Not Fitting

That is also the case with Scholten's appointment, although to a lesser degree. Now that the international situation, especially the aspect of security inherent in it, is as tense as this cabinet -- amongst others -- claims, it is not fitting to allow precisely the minister of defense to leave. The presence of a notorious bungler in foreign affairs works as yet another aggravating circumstance here.

Referral to an alleged precedent in 1933 -- made by CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] Leader Lubbers -- doesn't refer to anything. Minister Beelaerts, who was appointed vice president of the State Council at the time, had already been out of office for two months.

How careful has the cabinet been in the proceedings? It stuck to the rules in a strictly formal manner. The State Council was "heard" as prescribed by law, but its advice was repudiated, which is allowed. But whether one acted "courteous" in that, to quote Terlouw, is something else again.

Furious Rush

The cabinet was in a furious rush: on the same day the council of ministers decided, the proposal was pushed under the nose of her majesty the queen, who was visiting Assen, for her signature. Prior consultation of members of the cabinet, parliamentary group chairmen and further deliberation with the State Council about the rejection of its views were omitted.

Formally everything was correct, but in fact it was a remarkably blunt manner of acting. Finally there is the question about polarization of the

appointment policy under this cabinet. Among all the dividing justice which must be exercised in a political system of minorities such as the Dutch one, the quality of the appointee must have priority. The prime minister was right with that argument yesterday, of course.

Political Dispersion

The question of whether Minister Scholten is a better candidate than the two gentlemen pushed forward by the State Council itself is not gone into. Here it is a matter of the required political dispersion and that is starting to become remarkably limited with respect to higher posts. In view of the turmoil around the post of chairman of the European Commission, the cabinet in any event creates the impression that it considers anyone acceptable, as long as he isn't a socialist.

Such a policy would be contrary to accepted rules of the game in Dutch politics, no matter how understandable Van Agt's hate of socialists, developed over 7 years, may be.

Den Uyl was right: there are little polarizing traits in the appointment policy, especially to the extent the role of prime minister is a central part of it. But if Van Agt has developed polarizing manners in that respect, then Den Uyl might wonder from whom the prime minister learned those. The policy in the previous [Den Uyl] cabinet was not so very pure either, as J. M. Bik explained last Monday in very great detail on this page.

It is a policy derived from cultivated arrogance of power. Or is it possible the cabinet has already started with its going-out-of-business sale?

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CSO: 3105

RADICAL LEFTISTS FORM PVD A SPLINTER GROUP

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 1 Jul 80 p 2

[Report: "Group of 16 PvdA Members Bell the Party Cat"]

[Text] Rotterdam 1 Jul--The PvdA in Rotterdam has been showing two faces recently. Although the comparison is true only in part, it can be concluded with a little exaggeration that the rebirth of the New Left came about in the harbor area. Sixteen party members, including five council members and a member of the second chamber, united themselves into the Group of Sixteen in order to give the PvdA in Rotterdam a more leftist appearance.

Their most important grievance is that the PvdA pays too little attention to its ideology in this period of economic decline. This allegation is aimed primarily at the administrators in the Rotterdam region. Not for nothing is the alderman of harbor- and economic affairs, Jan Riezenkamp, called the leftist boy with the rightist hands by employers.

Contradictions in their own house are not an unknown phenomenon in the national PvdA either. Therefore one can't speak of a typical Rotterdam conflict. But it is indeed clear that the lack of a unanimous PvdA standpoint on the policy for social-economic developments has considerably fanned the little flame in Rotterdam.

The lack of a blueprint is felt very seriously in this city in particular, because the PvdA is occupying all the aldermen seats.

Environment

Employment opportunity and environment often have strained relations and from that condition the Group of Sixteen was born.

At the beginning of this year, Member of the Second Chamber Frans Moor from Hoek van Holland threatened to quit the PvdA when it became clear that a majority of his party associates in the Rotterdam council, the Public Organ for the Mouth of the Rhine and the provincial states of South Holland opted for the supply of liquid petroleum gas LPG to the harbor area before the

regional meetings had taken a standpoint. The PvdA following later on thus voted in vain against the LPG plans.

Frans Moor: "For me that was the drop which made the pail overflow. The months before that there had already been serious differences of opinion." Those differences were aimed especially at the policy of Alderman Riezenkamp.

An example of this is his Harbor Note. According to Moor, the Rotterdam administrator opted too easily in those policy notes for expansion of all sorts of industries in the Waterway area without paying enough attention to their consequences to the environment.

Growth

Also the note "Support for those unable to stand on their own feet" from a task force in the PvdA clearly showed the schism between the left- and right wing. In this item of discussion it was proposed that economic growth is a condition for redistribution of income, knowledge and power. A recommendation was made that that should take place in the area of the mouth of the Rhine through strengthening of the market sector, private industry and the attracting of new companies.

Investigation

This was the reason for a group of PvdA members to conclude angrily that the PvdA voters who are less solidary to the extent they earn more, are not true members. The end of the story was that the composers of the note were sent back to the drawing board.

Moor's threat to leave the party caused the administration of the Rotterdam region to initiate an investigation into the difficult relations between the majority board, the council group and the region. The commission of investigation, directed by national PvdA Secretary Wim van Velzen, came to the conclusion that serious differences of opinion indeed do exist in the Rotterdam region, but that the situation is not yet threatening. The most important recommendations of the commission are: more information, more consultation and an annual work plan.

Parliamentary Group Chairman Joop Linthorst as well as Frans Moor applauded this last recommendation in particular. According to them it is extremely important for the council group to make a work plan each year, so that the branches in the Rotterdam region are informed of the expected developments at an early stage and thus they can have a part in determining the final standpoint.

Position of Parliamentary Group

The position of the majority board remains unsolved, however. The situation now is that the board is definitely a part of the council group. The group

of sixteen finds that this point must be brought up for discussion once again before the municipal council elections in 1982. More distance between the board and the parliamentary group is urged, so that the parliamentary group can judge the proposed plans more freely and independently.

Linthorst doesn't deny that that situation could lead to the council members being better able to represent themselves individually. But according to him that would be at the expense of the administrative power and thus the identity of the PvdA becomes less clear to civilians.

"We must not get stuck in the phase that everyone wants something different and that subsequently nothing happens" says Linthorst. "In the first place one is elected to the municipal council to carry out the election platform. One should consider the interest of the group to be more important than individual interest."

Other Policy?

Whether the group of sixteen will really succeed in bringing about changes in the Rotterdam PvdA, depends to a great extent on whether they will be able to develop another policy, according to the parliamentary group chairman.

Moor is very optimistic about this: "In 6 weeks we will submit the note on economic developments in the harbor area and further we are currently working very hard on notes on drug addiction problems in Rotterdam and on the policy with respect to housing."

In the note on the desired economic developments in the Waterway area the Group of Sixteen concludes that work opportunity is one-sidedly based on oil. They plead for emphasis on attracting other and labor-intensive companies because otherwise work opportunity will decrease considerably.

Also the effect on the environment has a high priority in the note. One is of the opinion that the environment in the river mouth area of the Rhine may no longer be impaired in any manner whatsoever and that in attracting new companies this aspect must weigh very heavily.

Alderman Riezenkamp stated in an interview recently that he realizes that his policy is for a number of party associates a reason to see tough resistance ahead. Quote: "That cockfight in the party will also have to be tackled then. The party really should be asked a few questions. Of course that is happening on the national level too. By means of one of the conclusions that promises made to voters should not run too much ahead of what can be realized in political practice."

ARP FAVORS NETHERLANDS LEAVE NATO

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 9 Jun 80 p 3

[Text] A large majority in the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] party council wants to leave room for the possibility that the Netherlands will take initiatives, if need be outside NATO, to slow down the arms race. The party council formulated this last Saturday in accordance with advice from the management to accept an amendment to that effect to the draft of a program of CDA principles. The KVP party council rejected such an amendment in Helmond.

The committee for a program of CDA principles, under the leadership of Limburg's Commissioner of the Queen, Kremers (KVP), with, among others, the following members: Minister Scholten (CHU, Defense) and De Koning (ARP, Development Cooperation), proposed the following text: "The CDA wants to slow down the arms race within the framework of a policy to prevent war and maintain peace and security in cooperation with its allies: "The committee objected to Prof B. Goudzwaard's proposal to change that into: "... preferably in cooperation with its allies." This had caused Goudzwaard to leave the committee and to announce that he would not become a CDA member or take a seat in the Second Chamber.

Last Saturday Goudzwaard got the ARP party council on his side in spite of a defense by Minister De Koning of the text as proposed by the Kremers committee. De Koning said that this was the only subject on which the Kremers committee had not voted unanimously. He warned that insertion of the word "preferably" was not without danger.

De Koning was afraid that if the Netherlands would operate outside the treaties with its allies, it would loosen its already limited influence entirely. He warned against the "emotional satisfaction Dutch unilateral action would provide."

Goudzwaard said, however, that the DDA should not be caught on a "pendulum" of pleading for arms control on the one hand, and actual acceptance of NATO strategy on the other hand. Goudzwaard found it ominous that the Christian

democratic parties had decided on their demise before they had reached a decision on a program of principles and an election platform. He viewed that as an indication for the future of the CDA and talked of a "game of appearances." "I doubt that the CDA is the historic continuation of the ARP."

The final word of the program will have to be spoken by a CDA election congress in February 1981.

Saturday the ARP party council rejected with a large majority a resolution by Feddema who asked for a special CSA congress to express before the official merger a preference for cooperation with the PvdA [Labor Party], D'66 [Democracy 1966], and PPR [Political Party of Radicals] and staying at a distance from Prime Minister Van Agt as possible leader of the slate of candidates. A resolution which asks the Christian democratic delegations to unanimously support an abortion proposal "on the basis of the spirit" of the present proposal by the cabinet, was accepted.

The party management and the party council also gave their support to a resolution which asks that The Netherlands join countries conducting an oil embargo against South Africa, if need be without the support of EC partners. In another resolution which was adopted the Christian democratic delegations are asked to support the Middle East policies of the Dutch government only "if solidarity with Israel forms its unassailable core."

During the discussion chamber member J.N. Scholten had originally referred to "an Israel resolution" which he did not find balanced enough and, according to him, did not do justice to the policies of Minister Van de Klauw (Foreign Affairs). Also because of his insistence the idea that "a solution of the justified demands of the Palestinians is indispensable" was made part of it with the clause "on the basis of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people."

Mortgage Interest

In Helmond the KVP party council declared itself in favor of a limit to the fiscal deductibility of mortgage interest starting with mortgages above 400,000 guilders. That amount should be indexed and a transitional arrangement should be made.

The party council agreed with the plan to merge and become CDA and the decision to abolish the KVP on the date of the merger (11 October) but it had insurmountable objections against a change in the method of arms control as proposed by the ARP party council.

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CSO: 3105

ANALYST VIEWS HOW DEFENSES MEASURE UP TO ATTACK SCENARIOS

LD071329 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Carl Bjoereman: "Attacks on Sweden--Two Typical Cases; Swift Growth in Strength Before Mobilization"]

[Text] DAGENS NYHETER has taken up the question of how the rest of the world sees Sweden from the viewpoint of its security policy. The five Scandinavian nations' differing lines in foreign policy together form a pattern which is considered to favor detente in Scandinavia. Security policy is intimately connected with foreign policy. How do our defenses--those that we actually have now at the beginning of the eighties--live up to the role they have in "the Scandinavian pattern?"

Even a superficial comparison between Sweden and a number of other countries shows that our defense forces are "different" from the defense forces in the superpower blocs. According to "military balance" (The Institute of Strategic Studies in London), West Germany, for example, and Sweden have roughly the same number of brigades (36 and 29 respectively) and roughly the same number of combat aircraft (480 and 432 respectively), despite the fact that defense costs in West Germany are 5 times higher than those in Sweden (80 billion versus 16 billion, reckoned in Swedish kroner).

West Germany pays for a higher level of readiness (all the West German brigades are on continual active service in peacetime, ours only during short refresher course maneuvers), for a longer period of training, and for considerably higher "incidental costs."

In terms of numbers does Sweden need its present defense force? Is readiness not too low? Would we have time to train units together?

To answer these questions I will for the sake of simplicity (and for the sake of brevity) deal only with two types of attack here--attack before and attack after mobilization.

The two types of attack have the same point of departure:

1. Swedish territory is affected in the event of an attack against us. The attacker from one of the superpower blocs may want to base air defenses (for example against cruise missiles) and attack aircraft here. He may want to prevent the other superpower bloc from exploiting our territory for the same purpose.

2. We do not live under continual threat of immediate attack. The Afghanistan crisis shows how quickly crisis can develop and become an immediate threat--for us too. The superpowers build up stocks of military equipment so that they can act quickly.

Even after the Afghanistan crisis it is likely however that political changes would take place before anyone would resort to military force in Europe. The political warning lights would flash for a number of days, weeks or months.

Our government can increase the readiness of our serving units and increase readiness for mobilization but cannot rectify any lack of training or equipment in the units of the military organization.

And so the two types of attack:

1. Attack before mobilization: we have not mobilized. A surprise attack from NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The attack comes directly from the attacker's peacetime positions. We are forced to mobilize and start fighting simultaneously.

In this "case" we could start with [word indistinct] up our defense with combat planes, with the vessels manned in peacetime, the home guard, a number of local defense units capable of rapid mobilization and, possibly, those units undergoing training (for example, refresher course units).

But even if the aggressor has the opportunity to land units or to penetrate deep into the country, we have--as is not so well-known--the possibility of a swift buildup in forces even if an attack comes before the order for mobilization.

The airborne divisions of the air defense forces and the attack squadrons are all kept on active service in peacetime. They can quickly increase their readiness for action, as can between one-third and one-half of the navy's vessels. Mobilizing units from the coastal artillery and the army can also be ready quickly.

Some 100,000 civil defense personnel will be ready for action within a few hours after the alarm has been given.

The buildup of the army units' forces means that 60 percent are mobilized within 2 days, the rest within a further 2 days.

The defense forces' total buildup in strength in units in the air, at sea and on land makes it therefore possible even in this situation of surprise partly to meet and combat surprise attack forces that have been landed--thanks to a large number of Swedish units--wherever the attack is directed in the country, and partly to concentrate our forces.

The intention is to strike a blow at the attacking forces or--if that is not successful--prevent them from reaching their goal quickly enough and presenting the other superpower bloc with a fait accompli.

We run a great risk of course of being in an inferior position in sparsely populated areas, such as Norrbotten, but not even there are we in the event of a surprise attack without a chance of achieving the objective of delaying and making progress difficult for the attacker for so long that his attack becomes meaningless.

Despite the decrease in the numbers of units, principally mobile units, during the seventies, we still have, in fact, a fairly reasonable balance between these mobile units and many scattered stationary units, which can intercept an attack and protect the activities of the mobile units. This balance is of importance even in a situation after mobilization.

2. Attack after mobilization.

The aggressor may in this case have made preparations which mean the number of troops involved in the attack would be greater than in the previous case, both initially and thereafter. Only the Warsaw Pact seems at present to have the resources for such an attack.

The main problem with attacks when the aggressor has had the time to make comprehensive preparations and when we have mobilized is as follows: to gather during intense combat sufficient forces in the area where the aggressor makes his main attack.

As a result of his combat and transport technology he can leave us uncertain for a long time about the location of his attack. In this case too we could be forced to surrender ground if the aggressor gains the upper hand and our units do not function well in concerted action.

It is, of course, impossible to reach any conclusions in peacetime about how an attack would come about and how we would succeed in resisting it. However, we have definite ideas about what it is we want to achieve.

If an attack is made we would want to meet it in our coastal or border regions. This is best for our security policy.

If we cannot succeed in doing this we must be able to delay the aggressor so that he does not achieve his objective within a reasonable space of time. This possibility must also be made to seem unworthwhile for an attacker; Swedish defenses would then prevent war and preserve peace.

We are studying--as are foreign countries--different war scenarios. The results of such studies indicate that our present defense forces have the capacity to prevent war that I mentioned above.

But it is the evaluations of the rest of the world that decide whether our capacity makes a contribution to the stability of Scandinavia or not. It is, therefore, essential that for instance by means of maneuvers on a larger scale--where many units from different branches of the defense forces collaborate--and with mobilization maneuvers we show that we are as good as we think we are.

CSO: 3109

FORCES COMMANDER LJUNG URGES INCREASED SPENDING

LDO71259 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Jun 80 p 9

[Interview with Swedish Commander-in-Chief General Lennart Ljung by Omar Magnergaard: "Unanimous Military Leadership Behind Commander-in-Chief's Proposal"]

[Text] Some 350 million kronor more per year than the highest government option. This is Commander-in-Chief General Lennart Ljung's proposal for Swedish defense planning up to 1992.

With a united military leadership behind him General Ljung presented his proposal--the so-called perspective plan--on Wednesday to the government and Defense Minister Eric Kroenmark.

The commander-in-chief has had two government options to examine--but has stuck to his own, which comes as no surprise. It will mean 14.95 billion kronor per year between 1982 and 1987 (the budget at present is 13.6 billion kronor).

Another option that the commander-in-chief outlines--and which is a little cheaper than the highest price that the government can envisage--contains, like the commander-in-chief's own, both general conscription and a new Swedish aircraft. But the third option, which agrees with the Social Democrats' approach to defense spending, does not.

"That would be plain madness and a catastrophe," Lennart Ljung said.

His perspective plan will form the basis for the work of the defense committee. In March 1982 the government will present a proposal for a new defense bill for the period 1982 through 1987.

After his visit to the Defense Ministry SVENSKA DAGBLADET had a short interview with General Ljung.

[Question] You say that "the 1982 defense bill will be more crucial than previous postwar defense bills for our future security policy and the role of the military defense forces in this." Why is this one more crucial than other defense bills in the fifties, sixties and seventies?

[Answer] Because the defense forces have steadily shrunk and we are now in the situation where we must choose: we must either prune our defense capacity drastically or destroy it all together.

[Question] But your own opinion must mean some form of rearmament?

[Answer] No, the number of serving peacetime units decreases in all three options. We cannot do anything about this. It is not the army but the government and Riksdag that determines Sweden's defense needs. Option 1 will give our wartime units better quality. Option 2 means that we would just about be able to retain general conscription and develop the JAS plane. Under the third option there would be a collapse even during the eighties.

[Question] How do you know?

[Answer] The report material that we are now presenting has been checked and tested in countless games for over 3 years. We have worked with different attack situations and have considered what is needed--both in terms of personnel and equipment--to resist an enemy.

[Question] But defense takes almost one-tenth of the national budget anyway.

[Answer] At the beginning of the sixties we took 20 percent. So defense is by no means the cuckoo chick in the nest of national finances that some people would have us believe. And if you look at our share of gross national product it will not increase in any of the three options presented. In countries around us that do not have healthier economies than ours a continual increase in the defense budget is taking place.

[Question] What is most important in the perspective plan for you?

[Answer] Credibility and balance. That is to say, to retain and develop a defense force that is credible and which will make an attacker think more than twice before attacking. That an attack would cost him more than was palatable. And that this defense force strikes a balance between army, air force and navy. All three branches are so badly needed.

[Question] When must a decision about aircraft be made?

[Answer] By 1982 at the latest.

[Question] What has the spy Bergling cost the Swedish armed forces?

[Answer] I will not say. But it is a matter of enormous sums. In all three options money has been allocated to mitigate the effects of his treachery. But we will not, of course, tell Bergling's paymasters how much we are investing to repair the damage.

[Question] Do you intend to rely more on volunteers to save money?

[Answer] We will be extremely dependent on the voluntary organizations in the future too. For example, we have in this country a unique force of 100,000 home guardsmen, who are available at 2-3 hours notice. They and the women's services, the Women's Motor Transport Corps and many others are something we should be thankful for, like the reserves and the conscript officers, who have key posts in our military defenses. In the future the army will try to make even better use of the civilian expertise that conscripts have when they begin their basic training.

[Question] Is it possible to improve conditions for conscripts with present economic resources?

[Answer] This fall we will have an investigation of the economic situation of almost 8,000 conscripts ready. I personally think that the question of their economic problems should be transferred to the social services--as is the case with men on refresher course exercises. I think it is unfortunate that we have to weigh the money needs of conscripts on the one hand against weapons and canons on the other.

[Question] How do you enjoy your post of commander-in-chief?

[Answer] Very much. I have so many fine colleagues. And the best thing of all is that the conscripts now have such a positive attitude. Even their relations with their officers seem to have improved considerably. The atmosphere in the various units is completely different now from what it was during the seventies.

CSO: 3109

COMMENTATOR ANALYZES DEFENSE SPENDING OPTIONS

LDO71311 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 80 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson: "More Regiments Will Die"]

[Text] Mass death among the country's regiments, halt for new combat aircraft and abolished conscription. According to the Swedish commander-in-chief this could be the result, if the defense forces are not given more money. Today DAGENS NYHETER profiles the three options for the defense forces in the future.

Option 1 means that six army units would be disbanded in the next 10 years, but universal conscription could be maintained and conscript training improved.

The army will complete its modernization of 10 infantry brigades and a new light combat vehicle will be developed.

The navy will have new missile boats and the number of submarines will be increased. Mobile blocking battalions [apaerrbataljoner] blocking companies and coastal commando units will be reorganized to form three amphibious battalions.

The air force would be organized in 10 hunter divisions and the new aircraft system, JAS, would be developed in Sweden. An airborne radar surveillance system for cruise missiles, for example, would be acquired.

Military personnel would be reduced by 3,800.

From the national security viewpoint there would be a good chance of resisting pressure and threats. The ability of an attacker to carry out surprise attacks would be small. The defense forces would be able to halt an aggressor in the majority of situations.

Option 2 means that 16 military units would be disbanded, but universal conscription would be retained.

The army would modernize 12 infantry brigades and a new light combat vehicle would be developed.

The navy would purchase new missile boats, but the number of submarines would be unchanged and only a mine clearance flotilla would be established.

The air force would have eight hunter divisions. The armaments for JAS would have to be bought abroad. An airborne radar system against missiles would be acquired.

Military personnel would decrease by 5,400, but no redundancies would be necessary.

The defense forces would be able to meet the most pressing national security demands, but the cuts would mean uncertainty with regard to Norrland. In the event of a coastal invasion the defense forces would be able to delay an aggressor but only recapture lost territory to a limited extent.

Option 3 means the disbanding of 25 military units, the closing of the Swedish aircraft industry and the introduction of selective conscription.

Each year around 50,000 men enter military service. Selective conscription would mean that one-fourth--11,000 conscripts--would escape the draft.

Instead of the internal development of the JAS combat aircraft, planes would have to be bought abroad.

The alterations to the defense organization would lead to reduced credibility for the Swedish policy of neutrality. An attacker would have greater opportunities of carrying out surprise attacks on Sweden.

Defense force resources would have to be concentrated in certain parts of the country. In the event of a coastal invasion an aggressor would be able to penetrate deep into the country in a short time. Communications with Norrland could be cut.

Personnel would have to be reduced by around 10,000 men. This would mean that redundancies would be unavoidable.

Decisions on the disbanding of several regiments will have to be made during the eighties, even with increased defense costs. Swedish Commander-in-Chief General Lennart Ljung gives a warning of this in his program plan for 1982-1992, which was presented to the government on Wednesday. In the most expensive option 6 regiments would disappear, in the middle option 16 would go, and in the cheapest 25 peacetime units. The cheapest option also means that universal conscription would be abandoned and the development of a new Swedish aircraft would be stopped.

Since the end of the sixties the strength of the defense forces has fallen successively. The defense resolution for the 5-year period 1982-1987 that the national authorities must adopt will in the opinion of the commander-in-chief be more crucial than in those in the past for the direction of national security policy and the role of the military in this security policy.

Sweden must either develop its military defense so that the Scandinavian balance is preserved or accept a reduction in military resources that would lead to a credibility loss for Swedish neutrality policy. The long-term decisions that Sweden now faces will, therefore, have consequences not only for Sweden but also for the countries in its immediate surroundings.

The commander-in-chief thinks that events in Iran and Afghanistan, for instance, have shown that the policy of detente is unreliable when the interests of the superpowers are affected by conflicts. Simultaneously with the deterioration in the world political situation Scandinavia has also become to a larger extent than before the object of the interests of the superpowers through the expansion of the Russian bases on the Kola Peninsula, the debate on contingency stockpiling of combat equipment in Norway and Denmark and the deployment of Russian nuclear submarines in the Baltic. But the report states that Sweden in itself is not a target for the superpowers.

The perspective that has now been presented comprises an account of the consequences for security, operations and planning at three different levels of budget for the coming 10-year period.

The budget levels have consequences both for peacetime organization and wartime organization. The peacetime organization of the army now comprises 46 units and 20 schools and that of the navy and air force 11 units each and three schools. The peacetime organization of the defense forces is estimated to give employment to 44,000 persons.

The perspective plan will form the basis for discussions in the parliamentary defense committee in its work on the structure of the defense forces in the coming 5-year period. The recommendations of the defense committee are expected around the end of the year. In the fall of 1981 the commander-in-chief will then present detailed plans for the 5-year defense resolution. The Riksdag will settle the matter in the spring of 1982.

This timetable means that the next defense resolution will coincide with the 1982 election campaign, which will be a tough showdown between the nonsocialist parties and the Social Democrats for government power.

Opposition social democratic proposals on the defense budget have been around 400 million kronor less than those of the nonsocialist parties. It might, therefore, be difficult to reach agreement within the defense committee on an increase in the defense budget when large cuts are being made in spending in the social sector.

The previous Liberal Party government presented two options to the commander-in-chief for consideration for the 10-year plan. The first in general means a prolongation of the present defense resolution with a small increase in the budget, the second a decrease more or less in line with the views of the opposition Social Democrats.

The commander-in-chief accepts neither of these options. To achieve a balanced defense force the commander-in-chief has constructed with the help of a united military leadership his own option which lies 600 kronor annually above the government's most expensive alternative. Thus, the commander-in-chief has asked for an extra 3 billion kronor for the 5-year period. Certain changes are, nevertheless, necessary in the peacetime organization of the defense forces.

In February 1979 prices present defense budget amounts to 13.6 billion kronor. Option 1, the commander-in-chief's line, means 14.95 billion kronor a year in 1982-1987 and 16.75 billion kronor a year for the next 5-year period.

Option 2, which corresponds to the nonsocialist parties, proposal, means 14.36 [billion] kronor a year in the first 5-year period and 14.9 billion kronor a year in the second. Option 2, however, lies 250 million kronor under the government ceiling to mark the fact that a lower figure is not acceptable from the viewpoint of security policy.

Option 3, which most closely resembles the Social Democratic line, means 13 billion kronor a year in both 5-year periods.

The commander-in-chief states that the defense forces' most important task is to deter invasions and that it is important to keep tension in Scandinavia at as low a level as possible.

His point of departure is that the whole country must be able to be defended for a lengthy time and that the defense forces should be so structured that they can retaliate against surprise attacks.

The defense forces' task is to lend credibility to the idea that a military attack on Sweden would be to the advantage of none of the superpowers. The ability to implement graduated increases in preparedness and to begin combat while still mobilizing must be improved.

Better use must be made of Sweden's natural defenses in the coast and border areas. This would best be achieved by means of a balanced defense in depth, which supposes attacks both by sea and after a land invasion in Norrland. The past lack of coordination between the navy and the air force on the one hand and the army on the other would thus be removed.

To discover cruise missiles and small missiles the defense forces need well-protected radar surveillance stations and airborne radar stations.

Cruise missiles can only be combatted by a combination of hunter aircraft and air defenses. Hunter aircraft armed with missiles must therefore be the main components in our air defense system, but air defenses on the ground with all-weather capacity are also needed.

The commander-in-chief's perspective plan is principally a basis for discussion for the politicians in the defense committee and many changes are conceivable before the Riksdag reaches a decision on it in 1982, if the timetable is adhered to and not interfered with by the 1982 election campaign.

It is, however, clear that there must be a great reduction in both the peacetime and wartime organization of the defense forces no matter which budgetary framework is chosen.

The commander-in-chief has therefore looked at the possibility of short-term training for conscripts, so that two conscript groups could be trained per year. The commander-in-chief has found that this is not a viable option. The savings that would be made are too small in relation to the effects it would have on the defense forces' organization.

Selective conscription would be better than short-term training, the commander-in-chief says. The Social Democrats have in the past been determined opponents of selective conscription and have always stressed the importance of universal conscription for the nation's desire to defend itself.

CSO: 3109

ECEVIT MOVES TO GARNER INDEPENDENTS' SUPPORT

'CUMHURIYET' Report

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Jun 80 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) -- RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit met for 2.5 hours yesterday in his office in parliament with 11 independent national deputies. All of the independents expressed the view to the RPP leader that "the fall of this government would be the best," it was learned.

A group of independents including Tuncay Mataraci, Hilmi Isguzar, Hasan Korkut, Serafettin Elci and Orhan Alp reportedly will join the RPP.

Ecevit's meeting with the independent national deputies began at 1600 yesterday and lasted until 1830. Attending the meeting were Hasan Korkut, Tuncay Matataci, Hilmi Isguzar, Mete Tan, Gunes Ongut, Mustafa Kilic, Orhan Alp, Serafettin Elci, Oguz Atalay, Nurettin Yilmaz and Cengiz Senses.

Despite having messages sent to him twice prior to the meeting, independent Abdulkadir Zilan did not want to attend this parliamentary meeting. RPP Secretary General Mustafa Ustundag, meanwhile, met briefly in the independents' chamber with Akin Simav, who left the RPP some time ago. Simav, however, did not come to Ecevit's meeting with independents.

At the meeting, the RPP general chairman criticized the Demirel government, saying, "This is the worst." Ecevit asserted, moreover, that he needed the full support of the group and the public in order that a new government might be formed.

The independent national deputies, having gotten the impression that Ecevit was definitely decided that the government should fall, said themselves that the fall of the government would be the best thing.

Some Independents Join RPP

Meanwhile, some of the independent nation deputies will reportedly join the RPP. Among them are Tuncay Mataraci, Hilmi Isguzar, Hasan Korkut, Serafettin Elci and Orhan Alp. Akin Simav and Cengiz Senses will join the RPP some time later and discussions about this will continue for a while, it was learned.

'DUNYA' Report

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 13 Jun 80 p 5

[Text] RPP leader Ecevit is rolling up his sleeves to overthrow the Demirel government. Once the General Executive Board set about introducing a question in parliament to overturn the government, RPP administrators began contacting independents and former RPP members.

According to leaked reports, the RPP deputy secretaries general are trying to transfer to the RPP those of the 11 who worked in the Ecevit government who are still independent. With the exception of Hilmi Isguzar, the bargaining continues to bring into the RPP the former JP [Justice Party] members Mete Tan, Tuncay Mataraci, Gunes Ongut, Mustafa Kilic and Serafettin Elci. Contacts through intermediaries have concentrated on Akin Simav, Cengiz Senses, Bekir Adibelli and Ali Haydar Eyupoglu. It is said that these national deputies are inclined to join the RPP but do not want positions if a government is formed.

Former RPP national deputy from Ordu Gunay Yalin is said to be joining the party also. Among the independents expected to support the RPP from outside, Oguz Atalay, Abdulkemim Zilan, Nurettin Yilmaz and Hasan Korkut are thought to have responded positively to the contacts and are expected to support the parliamentary question.

The week of hope for the RPP begins next Monday. It is said that during this week of hope the RPP will take the offensive, using the person-to-person approach of all parliamentarians and even contacting certain JP members who seem in the middle.

The RPP parliamentarians who are passing the big test and working side by side as the RPP Group in the presidential elections are said to be showing the same cohesiveness in order to bring down the government.

8349

CSO: 4907

'HURRIYET' SPECULATES ON ERBAKAN'S DESIGNS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 15 Jun 80 p 10

[Article by Ulku Arman in column "Ankara Behind Closed Doors": "Erbakan's Dreams of Forming a Government"]

[Text] Ankara (HURRIYET) -- Leaning on the table, his weight on his left arm while gesturing vigorously with his right, he was saying in a brittle monotone:

"If you do not accept these conditions or if you cannot get your organizations to accept them, it would be better, when you leave now, not to make any statement at all about our agreeing that the government should fall. I am not going to say anything about it."

The meeting ended, after this, with the usual courtesies and farewells and expressions of desire to meet again.

The Ecevit-Erbakan meeting held on Tuesday, 10 June, in the NSP [National Salvation Party] general chairman's office on the second floor of the Assembly had ended.

Bulent Ecevit looked worried as he left the meeting. And well he should; there were conditions set by Erbakan which Ecevit, who certainly wants the government to come down, was not at all expecting. In fact, there were conjectures and it was known more or less what Erbakan wanted, but at that meeting, the NSP general chairman spoke of conditions and made demands concerning the presidential election and the government which Ecevit was not expecting in any way.

Erbakan's Plan

Erbakan is known to be hungering for the position of head of government. But what kind of government does he want to head, what does he want to do? Till now, no detailed answer to this question had been forthcoming.

Combining what the NSP leader said to Ecevit that day with statements he has made in his close circle in the party, it is becoming clear what Erbakan is after.

The government model Erbakan dreams of and his plan for realizing it may be summarized as follows:

Necmettin Erbakan wants to establish what he calls a "national view government" with himself at its head. It would be a government in which Erbakan plans to raise the number of ministers in the 35-member Council of Ministers to have 21 or 22 NSP ministers. In this way, Erbakan's opponents within the party would be included in the cabinet, avoiding the danger of a split within the NSP. What Erbakan has been most worried about lately is resignations from his party and loss of seats in parliament. In the government he would form, almost all NSP parliamentarians would get positions with only the group administrators by necessity remaining out of the government.

Guarantee from Ministers

Erbakan would call on the RPP and the independents to support this government. RPP and independent ministers would be included in the cabinet in exchange for support. However, he would pick the ministers himself. Moreover, he would demand a guarantee from outside ministers that they would sign all directives issued. This guarantee might also be undated letters of resignation which non-NSP ministers would give to Erbakan upon joining the cabinet.

Erbakan explains his concern in this matter as follows:

"I would replace all governors and security officers as soon as the government was formed. I would lift the interest decree. I would cancel the standby agreement with the IMF. If even one minister cannot endorse these directives we would prepare, I cannot carry them out. So we have to get advance guarantees that they would not oppose us from the ministers we would put in the government."

Elections in October

Erbakan's plan does not end here...

He knows that if this government should remain in power for a long time, it would lose points because of the difficulties and hardships. So the thing to do is hold early elections in October. Some temporary relief could be ensured through certain temporary measures in a 3-month period of governing. He could place his men who would be used in the elections at key points. They would ensure his going into the elections with a big advantage. The intangible benefit he would get from this is the image that "the NSP can form a government" which would build respect for the party both within the NSP organization and among the citizenry and would increase votes.

These then are the major lines of the NSP leader's thinking (As long as men dream, he lives) on the subject of the government.

Let Us Come to the Presidency

The only problem is who would give him the task of forming a government like this...

Would acting President Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil say to Necmettin Erbakan, "Go ahead, form a government however you wish"? Erbakan says, "No, Caglayangil would not give me this task. But the matter does not end with the president's giving the job. There must be a president in Cankaya who would sign without objection all the directives we would send him."

In that case, before setting out to form a government, it is necessary that the presidential problem be resolved: "We must find such a presidential candidate in the RPP and get him elected so that he will be beholden to the NSP. Let him know that we want him, that we identify with the RPP, and that he was elected thanks to us. He must know that when we form the government tomorrow, he should repay his debt by not causing us any difficulty. The guarantee may be having him take an oath that we can do what we want or it may be giving a letter of resignation in advance."

Who, who, who? What weighs heaviest on Erbakan's mind is who would be the presidential candidate who would accept these conditions. The candidate they like at the moment may be RPP Senator Rahmi Erdem. However, they have not yet found the courage to approach Rahmi Erdem and recite these conditions. They are afraid that Erdem would react negatively to these conditions and are trying to test the ground, introducing the subject slowly.

Vote of Confidence Problem

Erbakan also knows that his ideal government model may encounter a negative reaction. This reaction may prevent his getting a vote of confidence.

Then, what should he do?

Here is the formula Erbakan has found to combat this problem:

"The RPP decision-making authority on such matters as joining the government, leaving the government and supporting the government is the general board of directors. Ecevit rules this board. It could take the decision to support a government that I would form. And the president, looking at the declaration that the RPP and the independents would issue on this, could charge us to form a government on the theory that we had 226 votes on paper. In fact, this happened in the past. Ecevit may not be able to rally all the votes of the RPP Group in a vote of confidence because he does not have full control of his group and perhaps we could not get a vote of confidence. But the formation of a new government is possible under present circumstances only through an RPP-JP [Justice Party] coalition. And since that will not happen, a new government cannot be formed. Our government, like the Sadi Irmak government, would remain in power until the elections without getting a vote of confidence. And we would do what we wish to do."

Fall of Demirel Government

In this context, Erbakan's thinking on the fall of the Demirel government as explained to his party colleagues is as follows:

"We have announced that it would not mean the fall of the government even if we withdrew our support from the government. We have nothing to do with the fall of the government. We would even abstain in an RPP-called question in parliament. In this way, the responsibility for the fall of the government would be fully on the RPP. There are two advantages in this:

"First, we would have satisfied our friends within the party who do not want the government to fall.

"Second, as long as the responsibility for the fall of the government belonged to the RPP, it would also have the burden of responsibility for forming a new government. We would never consent to a coalition with the RPP (Erbakan is worried that he would lose votes in the elections if he formed a coalition with the RPP and believes that his coalition partnership with the RPP in 1974 damaged him in the 1977 elections). In this situation, the RPP will become, in the eyes of the public, a party which overturned the government without thinking of the consequences and left the country without a government, and will be forced to accept my formula in the end and will come to me..."

There have been reports that Erbakan gave the RPP a guarantee that it "would purge the state echelons of NAP [Nationalist Action Party] members and NAP-leaning JP members."

These, then, are some of the facts accomplished in "Ankara behind closed doors..."

...appearing like a dream to the man who was moved to say, "Such a thing is impossible."

But, the future will show that the NSP is thinking and dreaming about the things written above from A to Z and is making its plans along these lines.

R349

CSN: 4907

CUMHURİYET WARNS OF ERBAKAN BECOMING PRIME MINISTER

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 2 Jul 80 pp 1, 9

[Editorial by Ugur Mumcu]

It is being asserted that NSP Chairman Erbakan wants to become prime minister of the government to be formed after the collapse of the present one.

The JP minority government will be toppled today and if work is under way to establish a new government, this government must be formed under the leadership of RPP Chairman Ecevit, who controls the most seats in the National Assembly. It is unthinkable that a party whose deputies exceed 200 would say to the chairman of a party with 24, "Come, lead us."

Parliamentary arithmetic is the sole obstacle to Erbakan becoming prime minister. Moreover, by what name should we call the hypocrisy of those who ask, "Can good old Erbakan become prime minister?" and then affix the coils of criminality--like "enmity toward Ataturk"--to such a suspicious question.

If Erbakan joins with Demirel, Turkes, and Feyziloglu to form a National Front government, this partnership would never be viewed as "treason toward Ataturk." But whenever the NSP and Erbakan approach the RPP or whenever the NSP uses its vote in league with the left wing of the RPP (as was done for the laws of repression), the shouts start to rise, "Oh, Ataturkism is being lost."

Are not those who ask today, "Will Erbakan become prime minister?" the ones who yesterday, during the 12 March period, bequeathed seats to the 10-member RRP (Republican Reliance Party) and the prime ministry to Ferit Melen? While the JP and the RPP just stood there in Parliament, those who said to the senator of a 10-member party, "Come, lead us," became the much-esteemed members of that day's "lofty Parliament."

If those who found Ferit Melen's prime ministry in harmony with democratic traditions were to come around today and ask, "Can the prime minister be drawn from a 20-member party while there is a 200-member party?", would they then say, "In the 12 March period, the military wanted Melen for prime minister." What else would they say?

The NSP's place, path, identity card, and function must be determined. When the NSP takes Demirel's arms, it is "Ataturkist," and when the NSP takes Kevit's arm, it is not the "enemy of Ataturk," that, in any case, is the NSP. If the words above the dais in Parliament--"Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation"--symbolizes a belief, a principle, and if this sovereignty alone is valid, and if one submits only to this sovereignty, then we must preserve the NSP's political existence.

Ideas characterized as "harmful" and "dangerous" cannot be allowed to exist in democracies. Ideas, simply, are divided into two categories: right and wrong. This right and this wrong are debated before the people. Only the people make the decisions as to what is right and wrong in elections. Voter majority decides.

In pluralist democracy, a place is provided for every political party and every idea--so long as it does not become the focus of armed activities. Political intimacies and associations are formed with ideas and parties that we do not like or think wrong. This is the requisite of a multi-party way of life, because democracy is a system of "compromise."

It is inconceivable that Erbakan will become prime minister of a government in which his party will comprise the backbone while a 200-member RPP just stands by. This is an obstacle that parliamentary arithmetic alone reveals.

Make Erbakan twice Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic. If the same Erbakan wants to become prime minister today, regard that as contrary to Ataturkism.

Stroke the beard of Erbakan, who sat cross-legged in the Eastern fashion during the National Front governments. Now when the same Erbakan is attempting to topple you, open the "literature of Ataturkism."

If--while saying, "Erbakan cannot become prime minister"--you alone observe, "He has so few seats in the National Assembly," why didn't you even faintly remember this rule when notables and sons of notables made the senator of a 10-member party prime minister during the 12 March period? If you think, "Influential circles are against Erbakan becoming prime minister," why did you permit the same Erbakan as Deputy Prime Minister of a "Republican government" to sign edicts of appointment and retirement for those "influential circles" you mention? Yes, notables, sons of notables, why?

The matter of Erbakan is like "litmus paper;" distinctive characteristics convey the colors of the National Front parties.

'RESISTANCE COMMITTEE' MEMBER INTERVIEWED

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 9-15 Jun 80 pp 6, 7

[Interview with an unidentified officer of a "Resistance Committee" by YANKI magazine]

[Text] [Text] On the Cover

It had been known that there was division among the groups known as the extreme left and that the division might go so far as open conflict. A basic reason for this division became pronounced in the pre-election debate of the "true method of struggle." While a rather broad sector of the extreme left contended before the 14 October elections that the "true struggle" was to join the independent candidates in the elections, support them and introduce fellow travelership into parliament, the Revolutionary Road faction opposed this. This group said that "elections are a fraud and because of this, supporting the independent candidates will be in vain." And in line with this thinking, it steadily maintained that it was necessary to "unite in Resistance Committees," which it first proposed in 1975.

This rift cut even deeper during the elections and in addition to slogans calling for the support of one candidate or another, walls were plastered with the slogans, "No to election fraud," "One Way" and "The only choice is the people's own administration." While the independent candidates were unable to attain any visible success nationwide, the organizations known as "Resistance Committees" were seen to spread in various regions of the country, especially in squatters' districts. There were continuous reports of clashes from the squatters' areas. Security forces would go into the areas on operations, conduct searches and clean the walls, but the slogans reappeared the next day.

Organizations of this sort exist on the right also. However, the regions "liberated" by rightists were not without a party and took the side of the Nationalist Action Party in the elections. One is backed by a legal party, the other by an illegal organization.

Despite Demirel's statement in almost every press conference since his first that the "liberated region fad will end or is ending" and statements by Interior Minister Orhan Eren to the effect that "there is no such thing," these regions are in the situation today that no one can go and walk around at ease. And according to the former Ecevit government, their numbers have increased and are increasing rapidly.

We had the opportunity to talk with an officer of one of the Resistance Committees, which have been organized especially on the outskirts of the cities and in the squatter districts. This officer answers YANKI's questions:

Question: Why was a route taken such as boycotting elections instead of seeking power through elections?

Answer: The past has shown in clearest terms that elections have changed nothing in the eyes of millions of proletarians and that no matter who comes to power, the country is still run by big money and imperialist forces. National deputies are bought and sold, governments fall and governments are formed, no matter what the governments which are formed say, the country is still run by a handful of big money owners and the IMF, devaluations and price hikes take place on their orders, workers, civil servants and peasants are doomed to hunger and poverty. It is necessary to make them understand that the only way to be free of this order, these deceptions, this deprivation, this poverty and want is for the revolutionary people to form their own rule, not by voting for one party or the other. And the best way to do this is by saying "No" to all these injustices, this exploitation, want and oppression and to the "election fraud."

Question: What do the Resistance Committees propose instead of elections?

Answer: The Resistance Committees have offered as a statement of fact that in such times, resistance should be organized within the broadest popular sectors against the emerging and growing fascism and that this resistance should become a revolutionary struggle. A minor civil war is taking place in Turkey today in which an average of 10 people per day are dying. And today, the popular societies which are not to be scoffed at in many regions of our nation are carrying on their lives, depending on the measures they take themselves for their security. All the incidents experienced to date (even just one such as Maras) have removed any debate

as to how appropriate and necessary a proposal the Resistance Committees' proposal is. Since this proposal was offered, countless committees have been formed throughout the nation and experiments tried. As for their achieving full success, that will take time, patience and know-how.

Question: What is the aim of these efforts?

Answer: The Resistance Committees may be taken in many cases as a matter of the protection of the people in an area by means of the defense units we have formed. But this is not all. Besides this, all efforts have the nature of preparation for situations in which political activity will achieve supreme dimensions. It is necessary that the popular antifascist resistance movements aim for a long-term resistance struggle for a democratic popular administration and for organizing to this end.

Question: What is the goal in the long term?

Answer: The Resistance Committees must each be seen as a nucleus, a flowering of our future people's administration. This phenomenon means that a brand new society will begin to branch out in the heart of the old order of exploitation and oppression. It means that the seeds of a new state based on equality, brotherhood and a brand new democracy will take root in the cracks of a state built on inequality, injustice, poverty and oppression.

Question: Would you enlarge a little on your concept of democracy that you are talking about?

Answer: A new democracy, a concept of people's democracy is being developed and applied within the Resistance Committees. Revolutionaries take as a basis for decision-making the methods of debate and persuasion in order that the correct ideas may be adopted and applied by the popular masses.

Question: But what if they are opposed to your ideas and actions?

Answer: We are working for the formation of a United Resistance Front against fascism. It is inevitable that different views will exist among the ranks of the people within this front. We -- our attitude toward this difference among the people is critical of mistaken views, but tolerant.

Question: For example, robbing businesses and collecting money by force are contrary to this concept, are they not?

Answer: In all of our actions, we take a line clearly in the concrete interests of the people. This concept is necessary from the standpoint of getting the popular masses into the ranks of our war of resistance against fascism. Aggression against the proletarian sectors, the middle classes (robbing gas stations, grocery stores, butcher shops, for example) as a part of this concept is regressive, not revolutionary. As for the problem

of raising money, certainly the people must make their own contribution toward meeting the various needs of this struggle which is conducted for the good of the people's cause. However, it is essential that this contribution be knowing and voluntary. Not even the slightest hint of a threat is used against the people who do not give and, on the contrary, if there are some who try to pressure them in this regard, we oppose them and protect the victims of pressure.

Question: What sort of work is being done in the committees?

Answer: Defense efforts take precedence in areas where fascist aggression is heavy. Where attacks and threats are relatively light, committee work is done within the framework of the people's various social and economic problems. In addition to this, there is a diverse and vigorous education campaign.

Question: Have any concrete steps been taken toward solution of the people's problems?

Answer: The beginnings of a collective way of life are being fostered in the committees. There are people assigned to manage such bureaucratic concerns as obtaining residences, providing water, drainage, furniture and so forth. They take care of all the bureaucratic affairs of the local people. If a problem cannot be resolved through bureaucratic channels, the revolutionaries work side by side with the people in many areas from building roads to bringing drinking water and building houses. At the grocery stores and fruit stands opened (or vendors) we may provide opportunities for the cheapest sales. The money collected may be used for the school expenses of the local children one month and to provide cheap food another. As a concrete example, we may cite the case of a committee in the Black Sea area where the women complained about their husbands' going to the tavern and after discussion with the men and the tavern keeper, the tavern was closed. Now the men either go directly home or go with their wives to the "Public Room" which we set up for the local people as a place to meet and talk.

The Resistance Committees will gradually expand their areas and centralize and will be one of the most important links in the formation of a United Resistance Front on a national scale.

8349

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SUKAN CRITICIZED AT JP GROUP MEETING

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 12 Jun 80 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau) -- Faruk Sukan addressed yesterday's JP [Justice Party] Joint Group meeting, stating that he had returned to the nest, though he was harshly criticized by Ihsan Ataov, who spoke later. Wearing an expression of respect, Sukan entered the meeting behind Demirel and it was he who first took the floor. He said that he was happy to return to the nest after 10 years. "I am returning to the nest which I left 10 years ago for known reasons. We have a common struggle; we shall pursue it together," he said.

Ihsan Ataov, who spoke next, harshly criticized Sukan, saying:

"Who has taken into the JP this man who once joined the Ecevit government and handled the files on our general chairman? I have nothing to say to this person, because he is not a man. But I have a lot to say to those who would take this person into the party. How was this man taken into the JP, why was he taken in and by whom?"

Mehmet Zeki Okur spoke next, criticizing the decision to free interest limits and said, "Implementation of this decree will put the banks and bankers in competition. The loser will be the state banks, the Peoples Bank and the Agricultural Bank. The state banks cannot enter this race. If they do, they cannot perform their jobs. This decree must be reviewed."

8349

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DOUBTS ABOUT NSP, FUTURE ACTION PLAGUE RPP

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 12 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Fusun Ozbilgen]

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau) -- The RPP General Executive Board's decision to introduce a parliamentary question on the government came after the Ecevit-Erbakan meeting. The RPP executive had earlier debated whether they should introduce questions one by one on the ministers or a single question on the government and obviously put off the decision until a signal came from the NSP [National Salvation Party].

After Ecevit visited Erbakan and obtained "assurances," the decision was made to introduce a single question on the government, taking economic developments and terrorism as its topic. The RPP General Executive Board considered the "assurances" which Erbakan had given to Ecevit the day before to be adequate.

However, discussions held in the RPP Group yesterday indicated that the group members were generally not as happy as the RPP executive. Influential members who speak in group meetings only when important decisions are up came out one at the time expressing their doubts about a coalition with the NSP or saying that they did not like what might happen after the government fell. The timing of the question, moreover, was another source of uneasiness.

Some members did not have much faith in the NSP executive and the promises this party gave and the decisions it has made. Certain group members also had serious misgivings about any coalition that might be undertaken with such a party in the future.

Ecevit gave no information to group members on the details of his meeting with Erbakan. Perhaps he thought it improper to make a statement at this stage. An active administrator of the NSP told us yesterday, "We have drawn up a specific policy as the NSP executive and we are persisting in that policy, but we cannot openly explain this policy to the public for reasons which you well know."

The first stage of this policy which the NSP administrators have drawn up is to cooperate with the RPP to bring down this government; this much is clear, but the NSP executive is not saying this openly because it cannot explain it to their own public and certain elements within the party and because it is afraid of repercussions in Demirel's party. Therefore, it uses methods which will put its own policy in the best light among group members such as writing letters, setting conditions and allowing a week or a month's time. But in the last analysis, the goal is to bring down the government.

The NSP executive's subsequent policy, however, is not yet clear. It is possible, though, that the NSP leader explained his policy in this regard to Ecevit at the Ecevit-Erbakan meeting. Obviously, Ecevit spoke to his own group about "the need to form a government that would last until 1981" on the basis of these assurances.

According to one view prevailing among the RPP executive, Turkey and the regime have got to the point that even if no new alternative has been found, the first duty is to bring down this government. Some RPP administrators, however, feel that simply toppling the government would not do, that the formation of a new government must be present in the act that brings down the government. This is where the timing of the parliamentary question comes into play. [omission] wants the presidential problem resolved before a new government is formed. NSP administrators feel that Caglayangil may have quite some difficulty with an RPP-NSP coalition at the stage of forming a new government. And this is why Erbakan wants the RPP to put up a new candidate.

However, it has been clear for some time that an RPP candidate cannot be elected with NSP support. NSP administrators and those in the RPP who want to run do not like to face this fact. So there may be a new RPP presidential candidate next week.

According to the RPP executive, it is not overly important at the moment to force election of a president, and the government problem takes priority on Turkey's agenda.

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NAP OFFICIAL CALLS FOR 'NATIONAL DEFENSE PLAN'

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 9-15 Jun 80 pp 10, 11

[Interview with NAP Deputy General Chairman Agah Oktay Guner]

[Text] NAP [Nationalist Action Party] Deputy General Chairman Agah Oktay Guner answers YANKI's question:

Question: How do you interpret the mounting terrorism aimed at political leaders?

Answer: The mounting terrorism aimed at political leaders has the goal of moving Turkey rapidly toward internecine warfare. As known, this situation has been seen throughout the world in nations experiencing communist revolution. Communist terrorists, who publicly espouse their goal to destroy the Turkish state and divide the Turkish nation and whose purpose is communist terrorism and coup activity, have now started street fights, civil war on a large scale and are gunning down political leaders in order to set brother against brother. The NAP leadership cadre, which saw and spoke of this danger a long time ago, is the hardest hit. We, as responsible politicians in the face of all the sorrow and great loss, recommend respect for the law in the fullest sense, faith in the state and calmness to our members. Any other way is the easy way, is very dangerous and will set the state and the republic, indeed the entire nation, aflame.

Question: What must be done, in your opinion, to eliminate terrorism?

Answer: Martial law has been declared as the last resort against terrorism in Turkey. Martial law has been very successful in some provinces and regions. However, it is a total failure in some regions, such, indeed, as is very difficult to understand. The unsuccessful martial law commanders must be replaced immediately; unsuccessful security officers and administrators must be replaced immediately. The second important step in this struggle is the responsibility incumbent upon the politicians. Our politicians should stop short of making terrorism into political polemics. The entire nation should realize in the fullest sense the great value of democracy, the republic and independence and should come together within a sense of national unity against the terrorism designed to bring democracy to an

end. This unity can be ensured only by the political cadres. Another point, too, is the need to put a complete stop to arms smuggling which is the most important mainstay of terrorism. Our nation has become an open market for the international arms manufacturers. Enough weapons to supply armies may be seized, but how many have not been seized? Now in power, the government has not been able to achieve what it promised in this regard when it was in the opposition. Therefore, in our opinion, a national defense plan against anarchy should be prepared.

Question: What is this national defense plan?

Answer: In this plan the responsibilities of all organized powers and constitutional institutions should be determined, especially of the state, the political parties and the unions. The public must be informed of what goals are to be achieved in what specific period of time. The public must be informed about those who carry out the duties assigned them by the plan. The government must fully educate the nation as to the means and goals of terrorism. France, which experienced this phenomenon in 1968, applied a special plan in Paris. I invite the government to make it known whether or not the ways and means of the security forces are adequate for the struggle against the anarchists. The large cities should be divided into special zones, special teams should be formed and the security of the city administered by a single hand around the clock. With the success of martial law in 1971 as an example, it is impossible for the Turkish state to be beaten by anarchy in 1980.

Question: Could not the political parties cooperate in order that the struggle against terrorism might be effective?

Answer: We are in favor of cooperation among the political parties on every subject. There must be full interparty and intragovernment cooperation in order for the struggle against terrorism to achieve the desired goal. We have said as the NAP that we are open to mutual discussion on every topic. However, our requests for these talks do not usually get the understanding they deserve.

Question: Despite the RPP's castigation of the activist left, you do not castigate the activist right; why?

Answer: The NAP's entire upper echelon of responsible administrators has said that we oppose anarchy, whether it comes from the left or the right. We are the only ones who have constantly said that the anarchy-like terrorism in Turkey is wrong. The propaganda that there is a fascist anarchy on the right to oppose the communist anarchy on the left in Turkey is a political tactic that Mr Ecevit keeps harping on. It is impossible to solve the problem with this approach. The man who was prime minister for 22 months has to be serious. If there are right-wing activists in Turkey and politicians who cooperate with them, what Mr Ecevit should have done

was taken there in the Azat Courts when he was in power. I say quite plainly: we as the MAF and I as the MAF deputy general chairman oppose the man who takes up arms illegally, whatever color he may be, whatever may be his political disposition.

Question: Do you think the government's measures against terrorism are adequate?

Answer: The government has obtained visible results with the measures it has taken against terrorism. It is impossible to consider them adequate. The government should bring together all the organizations and all the institutions provided by the constitution to perform its duty to protect the state against terrorism. Next, the gov. should put into action a national plan against anarchy. All resources necessary for the state institutions to strengthen the state should be provided. The police should have at least 100 times their present force as to material resources, legal security, housing, weapons and equipment. The first problem today should be the concentration of attention on enabling the citizen to live without fear. The question today is the existence or nonexistence of Turkey.

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ISTANBUL SEES INCREASE IN THOSE SEEKING TO BUY GUNS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 14 Jun 80 p 6

[Article by Ahmet Ozgen]

[Text] More than 10,000 people have applied to buy guns within 1.5 months to the Istanbul Security Directorate, it was learned.

The number of applicants for gun permits reportedly is increasing every day following announcements that in accordance with the government's resolution on terrorism people in certain occupations would be given guns.

It will be recalled that Minister of State and Deputy Interior Minister Orhan Eren said in statements about the war on terrorism that lawyers and journalists holding yellow press cards would be allowed to apply for gun permits and also that a committee was set up to handle this.

Meanwhile, former RPP Interior Ministers Hasan Fehmi Gunee and Irfan Cezayirli said that they were "opposed to the government's decision on bearing arms" and that it would amount to national armament. The former interior ministers maintained that this situation demonstrates the state's impotence and said that certain party administrators had resigned after receiving guns, providing for their replacements to obtain guns also.

Retirees in Majority

Retired police and military officers are reportedly among the applicants to bear and keep arms in Istanbul. Authorities have reported in this context that they are getting more and more requests every day from other occupational groups as well.

What Does Law Say

Law no 1636 on firearms specifies who may keep or bear arms. The situation as set forth in this law, which was enacted on 10 July 1953, is as follows:

Article 7 -- Only the following may bear or keep firearms:

1. Those authorized under special laws to bear arms,
2. Members and employees of the state, municipalities, special police and state economic enterprises authorized to bear arms by cabinet decision,
3. Those holding permits issued by governors or district officers under principles defined and enforced by the Interior Ministry.

If no serious objection exists, permits must be issued upon requests to keep firearms in the home or at the job site. This permit covers keeping firearms and is not a permit to bear arms.

Permits to bear or keep arms may not be issued under any circumstances to those convicted of committing crimes with firearms.

Permits issued for the keeping of firearms in the home or at the workplace are not subject to fees.

Article 9 -- Those holding permits to bear arms may not sell or give these weapons, even temporarily, to others who do not have official permits.

If anyone holding a permit to keep and bear arms commits a crime with this weapon or if a crime is committed by others as a result of his negligence or incompetency in keeping the weapon or in the event of suicide or attempted suicide, the gun permit is revoked and he is not permitted to keep or bear arms again.

'FALSE PROPHET' ARRESTED FOR URFA ACTIVITIES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Jun 80 pp 1, 15

[Text] Bursa (HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY) -- A handsome self-proclaimed prophet named Abdurrahman Yunal, all of whose followers are women and who spends the night with one of them after performance of their rites, was arrested by police in Karacabey District of Bursa. The names of the women from all sectors of society who believed in the false prophet have been withheld to protect their families.

The handsome false prophet, who was to enter the last grade at the Bandirma Evening Trade School and who established an unnamed religious order, has been operating in Karacabey District of Bursa for the past 6 years and occasionally arranges tours of Urfa for women only at a cost of 3,000 liras, it was learned. The incident is described as a scandal in the district. Many women from good families reportedly had fallen into the false prophet's trap.

Police said that the false prophet, whom Karacabey security forces had been pursuing for 2 months, gave assurance, saying, "The police cannot raid us. I am a prophet. Nobody has power equal to this." The story goes that the false prophet was walking along the road 6 years ago when a woman came out of the crowd, embraced him and said, "You are our prophet. I cannot leave you now. I saw it in a dream."

According to the information given, the so-called prophet was arrested along with his wife and six other women in the raid on his home in the Selimiye quarter of Karacabey. In the search of the house, a variety of robes, fezzes and turbans, 99-bead prayer beads and tapes of sermons were found.

The false prophet reportedly met on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays with his female followers in various homes for religious rites in which he preached superficial sermons and then spent the night with a woman he chose after 0300.

An investigation is in progress on the form of the false prophet's activities in Urfa. The possibility is considered that Abdurrahman Yunal may have formed a network in an area including Istanbul, Sakarya and Denizli.

VIRTUAL HALT REPORTED IN MIGRATION TO ISTANBUL

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 12 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Necati Dogru]

[Text] Istanbul is no longer the city with streets paved with gold for the Anatolian people, and the great migration of the past 30 years has dropped to a level so low as to say that it has practically stopped. The city of Istanbul, where in past years approximately 250,000 people have come from various places in Anatolia and settled, has reached the point in mid-1980 where provincial citizens cannot find a job, where there is not a house to be rented and, most important, where one cannot make ends meet on 10,000 liras per month, which is the lowest pay available.

No Jobs

The most effective factor in the halt of migration to Istanbul, according to our evidence, is that people coming from Anatolia can no longer find jobs. It is even very difficult to find such jobs as shared-taxi driver, porter, shoe shine boy, construction worker or street peddler which are considered bread-and-butter jobs, especially for newcomers. Opportunities for getting into a state office with the help of a relative or getting a job as a laborer in a factory have become practically nonexistent for a provincial who has just arrived in Istanbul or is thinking about coming.

New arrivals can no longer find a place to lay their heads in Istanbul, even in the squatter sections. According to the research we conducted and the information obtained from people who live there, in Istanbul's new squatter zones on the ridges of Kagithane Deresi, in Umraniye 1 May District, Kartal, the three zones and fringes of Pendik and the districts built on the slopes on either side of the Old London Highway, the problem of greatest hardship to new and unprepared arrivals is the inability to find housing. Even the cost of building a one-room squatter's hut has reached 400,000 liras, and in the letters they write and the messages they send back to their villages, residents of these quarters tell their relatives not to come to Istanbul.

Fear of Anarchy

One important reason for the drop in migration to Istanbul which began in the 1950's and has recently come to a halt is terrorism. The people of Anatolia are widely fearful of the terrorism which has become a social phenomenon bred by big cities. Adding the inability to find work to the fear of terrorism, many who came last year but could not take root in the city are even going back.

Also according to our evidence, the former great migration to Istanbul has turned toward other flourishing cities. Chief among them are Adana and Izmir. Izmit, Bursa, Eskisehir and Mersin are also among the cities which have become the scene of most migration.

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MEASURES SAID DIRECTED AT TRADE WITH SOCIALIST NATIONS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 4 Jun 80 pp 1, 9

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau) -- With the JP [Justice Party] minority government's decisions published in the RESMI GAZETE last week as well as its 24 January economic decisions, measures have been taken aimed at reducing foreign trade with socialist nations, and the right of exporters to use foreign exchange amounting to 50 percent of the sales they realize has been lifted in trade with socialist nations. The decision is said to have been made under pressure of the IMF and OECD nations.

Earlier economic decisions offered additional opportunities to exporters for the purpose of encouraging exports. One of these has to do with allowing the exporter to use 50 percent of the foreign exchange earned from exports. Any exporter who sells, say, \$100-worth of goods abroad can use \$50, or half, to make his own purchases abroad, and this gives a measure of relief from the foreign exchange shortage.

However, with the additional economic decisions made by the JP government last week, certain restrictions have been placed on trade with the socialist nations and the exporter's right to use 50 percent of the foreign exchange earned from trade with socialist nations has been eliminated. Lifting the 50 percent foreign exchange right in foreign sales of industrial products for socialist nations alone, according to the experts, will automatically have the effect of reducing exports to these nations.

A New Communique

In addition to eliminating the right to use foreign exchange, another right is being eliminated, again limited to socialist nations, it was learned. The "export credit" for exporters amounting to 60 percent of their sales abroad is envisaged again as a means of encouraging exports. This amount which is paid in Turkish liras for financing exports will reportedly be limited by a new communique which is now in preparation. Accordingly, those who export to socialist nations will be unable to take advantage of the 60 percent export credit.

Publication of the communique in the RESMI GAZETE is expected soon.

IMF and OECD

Efforts were made in 1978 and 1979 during the Ecevit administration to invigorate foreign trade with socialist and Arab nations for the purpose of increasing exports and finding new markets, and trade with the socialist and Arab nations rose to 10 percent of overall foreign trade.

However, the IMF gave a report to Turkey at that time, expressing the view during talks with the ministers concerned that "trade with socialist nation nations should be reduced." The IMF even warned, not just Turkey, but Romania as well in 1979 (Romania is an IMF member) against increased trade between Turkey and Romania.

Now the IMF and the OECD nations have reportedly given Turkey a similar warning, requesting the reduction of foreign trade with socialist nations in particular.

Soviet Reaction

In addition, the Soviet Union has reacted to the JP government's recent decisions and the commercial attache in Ankara has requested a meeting with Trade Minister Halil Basol, a meeting reportedly delay because the minister is away from Ankara.

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SALE OF COTTON SAID JEOPARDIZED BY GOVERNMENT MEASURES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Baris Kudar]

[Text] Izmir -- Cotton has become another point of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. The attitude of the Foreign Ministry, which has taken no public stance on this matter, reportedly will result in Turkish cotton's remaining in stock in the days ahead. Finally, while it is said that the JP [Justice Party] minority government took measures to reduce foreign trade with socialist nations under pressure of the United States, the IMF and OECD, it has been claimed that implementation of the additional protocol which raises cotton exports from the 3,000 tons in the bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union to 10,000 tons will create objections.

Moreover, the new 6,000-ton cotton export quota granted in addition to the 3,000 tons in the additional protocol signed with the Soviet Union and published in RESMI GAZETE no 16856, 31 December 1979, was published in the 29 May RESMI GAZETE. Two private firms in Izmir reportedly will provide 2,000 of the 6,000 tons of cotton to be exported to the USSR, with 3,000 tons coming from TARIS [Agricultural Workers Union] and 1,000 tons from the Adana area. It is said that with this decision and the reduced fund deduction, the two firms stand to make approximately 40 million extra liras in profits.

U.S. Pressure

It is said that the measures taken by the JP minority government in addition to its 24 January decisions and published in the RESMI GAZETE last week were taken under U.S. pressure through IMF and OECD channels. According to the new measures, use by the exporter of 50 percent of the foreign exchange obtained from sales to socialist nations is eliminated. In addition, a new communique is reportedly in preparation eliminating the "export credit" of 60 percent of their sales to exporters.

Bilateral Agreements

One official, pointing out that contention over cotton had surfaced between the United States and the Soviet Union, maintained that Turkish cotton would be remaining in stock because of the Trade Ministry's failure to take a firm stand. Noting that U.S. pressure for the reduction of foreign trade with socialist nations had resulted in the recent measures, the official said, "It will be difficult under these circumstances to build additional facilities at Aliaga, the Seydisehir aluminum works and the Isdemir and Iskenderun iron-steel plants as well as to fulfill reciprocal agreements concluded for the sale at foreign market prices of export products. Cotton exports, which are not made at foreign market prices, will likewise stop."

Moreover, in implementing the new 6,000-ton additional quota in cotton exports to the Soviet Union, according to a gentleman's agreement, TARIS is to provide 3,000 tons of this amount, the Adana region 1,000 tons and two Izmir exporters 2,000 tons. The circles concerned, who point out that the commitments for this have already been made, have said, "With the 15-lira cut in the fund deduction to 26 liras and the \$2.05 price that will be applied, the two exporters will earn approximately 40 million liras more on the cotton they bought earlier for around 100 liras. The government's fund deduction cut has made this possible." The circles concerned said that with recent sales, exports reached 53,997 tons and that this amount would exceed 60,000 tons with the 6,000 tons to be exported to the Soviet Union.

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TEXTILE DEMAND WANES AS PURCHASING POWER DECLINES

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 5 Jun 80 pp 1, 11

[Text] Bursa (TURKISH NEWS AGENCY) -- Synthetic and cotton thread prices have plummeted as a result of the currency shortage in Bursa, but despite this the textile industry is at a complete standstill.

Bursa Silk Weavers' Association President Huseyin Ozturk said that the merchants who keep the textile looms busy were holding off because of "payment difficulties" and that the work rate of the looms had fallen below the seasonal norm for this reason. He continued as follows:

"The prevailing currency shortage has put the textile market on hold despite low thread and yarn prices. Until the first week of April, 70 denier polyester thread was selling for as much as 700 liras per kilo, and the price has now dropped to 525 liras. In the same time, the price of nylon thread has dropped from 625-650 liras and the price of pamgcipl9P [as published] from 300-310 liras to 200-270 liras.

"What worries us is that synthetic and cotton thread prices shot up from mid-1978 to the end of 1979. The reason given then was that the factories were working at low capacity. Despite nothing's having changed much between that time and the present, prices have dropped. One wonders who got the difference."

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